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I. Introduction
“If a tree falls in the forest, and there’s nobody around to hear,
does it make a sound?”1 While the answer to that question is “yes,”2
not all questions involving trees are so easily disposed.
The case of Matthew Cline presents an unfortunate example
of such a question. Cline was traveling in Charlottesville, Virginia,
“when a tree fell and crushed the roof, windshield and hood of the
vehicle Cline was driving. Cline suffered severe and permanent
injuries, including fractures of his cervical spine.”3 In the
subsequent suit, Cline alleged that Dunlora, the owner of the tree

1. Jim Baggot, Quantum Theory: If a Tree Falls in the Forest . . . , OUPBLOG
(Feb. 14, 2011), https://blog.oup.com/2011/02/quantum/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2019)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See id. (“[T]he answer depends on how we choose to interpret the use of
the word ‘sound’. If by sound we mean . . . audio frequencies, then we might not
hesitate to answer in the affirmative.”).
3. Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC, 726 S.E.2d 14, 15 (Va. 2012).
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and land, was responsible on a theory of negligence.4 The Supreme
Court of Virginia disagreed—the court found that the law did not
“impose a duty upon landowners to protect individuals traveling
on an adjoining public highway from natural conditions on the
landowner’s property . . . .”5 Thus, a question of law remained
unanswered: if a private landowner owes no duty with respect to
trees adjacent to the roadway, who, if anyone, does?
Following this case, Cline asserted that liability fell to the
Commonwealth of Virginia.6 The claim, however, was resolved on
assumption-of-duty grounds7 and did not turn to the question of
whether a road-maintaining entity8 has a duty to inspect for or cut
down dangerous trees adjacent to the roadways it maintains. The
question deserves an answer for safety’s sake in the
Commonwealth. This Note calls for an answer in the affirmative:
a road-maintaining entity should have a duty of reasonable care to
remediate dangerous trees adjoining the roadways it maintains.9
4. See id. at 16 (“Cline argues that the circuit court erred in ruling that
landowners in Virginia are not liable for personal injuries caused by trees that
pose an imminent danger or cause actual harm to persons using an adjoining
highway.”).
5. Id. at 18.
6. See Cline v. Commonwealth, No. 151037, 2016 WL 4721393, at *1 (Va.
Sept. 8, 2016) (“Cline now pursues negligence and nuisance claims against the
Commonwealth because the tree allegedly fell from the Commonwealth’s
right-of-way on the Dunlora property.”). Dunlora, the defendant from the original
case, made a similar argument. See infra notes 14, 18 (presenting Dunlora’s
argument that the state is liable for roadway-adjacent hazards).
7. See Cline, 2016 WL 4721393, at *2 (“Based on the record before us, we
cannot decide as a matter of law whether the Commonwealth assumed such a
duty. This question must be decided by the factfinder on remand.”) (citation
omitted).
8. See Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 18 n.6 (“The General Assembly has vested the
Commissioner of Highways with the power to do all acts necessary for
maintaining and preserving state roads. The duty of VDOT or any other entity
responsible for maintaining the safety of the roadway presents a question not now
before us.” (citation omitted)). The Virginia Department of Transportation
(VDOT) is the best example of a road-maintaining entity, but for the purposes of
this Note, a road-maintaining entity is any public or private entity charged with
maintaining a travelled roadway. See, e.g., infra notes 87–89, 170 and
accompanying text (considering private road-maintaining entities and providing
examples of public municipal maintenance programs).
9. See infra Part III.B (arguing for the duty of reasonable care). While a
later circuit court case unaffiliated with Cline has answered in the affirmative,
the question remains open as a matter of binding precedent in the
Commonwealth. See Zook v. City of Norfolk, 87 Va. Cir. 47, No. CL12–4019, 2014
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Part II of this Note considers whether a duty for
road-maintaining entities is tenable under Virginia law. The Part
also explores the rationale for imposing differing liabilities
between landowners and road-maintaining entities. Part III
reviews the various duties other states use with respect to
dangerous roadside trees and concludes that the duty of reasonable
care is most appropriate for Virginia.
Sovereign immunity is a companion issue and is addressed in
Part IV. The Part provides a brief overview of the policy arguments
for sovereign immunity, before reviewing immunity’s impact at the
state, county, and municipal levels. The Part also addresses a
government employee’s entitlement to immunity, before
considering a potential legislative solution to some of the present
difficulties associated with sovereign immunity.
Finally, this Note reviews anticipated impacts in the world of
litigation as a result of the duty of reasonable care,10 before
addressing the legal and policy arguments of those who say the
impact of such a duty would be negative.11
II. Imposing a Duty on the Road-Maintaining Entity
In Cline v. Dunlora South, LLC,12 the Supreme Court of
Virginia declined to find that “a landowner owes a duty to protect
travelers on an adjoining public roadway from natural conditions
on his or her land.”13 Although the private landowner argued that
the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) was

WL 3891750, at *5 (July 19, 2014) (finding that the Virginia Department of
Transportation had a duty of reasonable care to remediate a dangerous tree
adjacent to the roadway).
10. See infra Part V.A–C (reviewing applicability with respect to gross
negligence, assumption-of-duty, and other roadside hazards).
11. See infra Part V.D (answering the question, “why have a duty at all?”).
12. 726 S.E.2d 14 (Va. 2012).
13. Id. at 18. The court noted that “[t]he duty owed by adjoining property
owners is to refrain from engaging in any act that makes the highway more
dangerous than in a state of nature or in the state in which it has been left.” Id.
The court left open the possibility for liability on the basis of a landowner’s
positive act, but declined to impose a duty where “the allegations . . . are stated
in terms of a failure to act” with respect to trees left in a natural condition
adjacent to the roadway. Id.
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responsible for the safety of travelers on the highway,14 the court
declined to resolve the issue.15 Whether road-maintaining entities
have a duty to protect travelers from dangerous trees adjacent to
the roadway is a question that begs for an answer, but answering
in the affirmative is contingent first on determining whether or not
a road-maintaining entity can have any duties with respect to
roadway maintenance. This Part first reviews whether such duties
are tenable under Virginia law16 and then considers the
justification for imposing a duty on the road-maintaining entity
but not the private landowner.17
A. Virginia Justifications for Imposing a Duty on the
Road-Maintaining Entity
The court in Cline largely ignored Dunlora’s arguments in
favor of public liability,18 as they were unnecessary to resolve the
case.19 The court did note, however, that “[t]he duty of the [public
entity that maintains the highway] is to perform a positive act in
the preparation and preservation of a sufficient traveled way.”20

14. See id. (“[Dunlora] also claims that it is the responsibility of VDOT to
protect travelers on public roadways from injuries caused by dangerous
instrumentalities immediately adjacent to the roadway.”). This claim was made
to absolve the private landowner of any duty, as Dunlora asserted that “the safety
of the highway is a matter for the public authorities.” Brief of Appellee at 12, Cline
v. Dunlora S., LLC, 726 S.E.2d 14 (Va. 2012) (No. 110650), 2011 WL 9694959, at
*11.
15. See Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 18 n.6 (“The duty of VDOT or any other entity
responsible for maintaining the safety of the roadway presents a question not now
before us.”); see also id. at 21 n.6 (Lemons, J., dissenting) (same).
16. Infra Part II.A.
17. Infra Part II.B.
18. See Brief of Appellee at 8–19, Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC, 726 S.E.2d 14
(Va. 2012) (No. 110650), 2011 WL 9694959, at *7–18 (arguing for state liability
with respect to dangerous conditions adjacent to the roadway as a component of
Dunlora’s non-liability claim).
19. See Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 18 n.6 (“The duty of VDOT or any other entity
responsible for maintaining the safety of the roadway presents a question not now
before us.”).
20. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 14, 18 (alteration added in Cline) (quoting Price v.
Travis, 140 S.E. 644, 646 (Va. 1927)).
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The court also referenced VDOT’s statutory authority for
maintaining the roadways but offered no further analysis.21
Given road-maintaining entities’ responsibility and authority
for roadway maintenance, the court indicated that it may recognize
a higher standard of liability for road-maintainers than for private
landowners.22
Furthermore,
it
is
evident
that
the
road-maintaining entity would be responsible for roadway
maintenance in and adjacent to the road because, as the court has
found, highway safety considerations can extend beyond the
bounds of the physical roadway.23 A circuit court found that VDOT
and the City of Norfolk had duties with respect to a dangerous tree
adjacent to the roadway, post-Cline,24 adding legitimacy to this
21. See id. at 18 n.6 (“The General Assembly has vested the Commissioner
of Highways with the power to do all acts necessary for maintaining and
preserving state roads.”); see also General Powers of Comm’r of Highways, VA.
CODE ANN. § 33.2-223 (2018) (“[T]he Commissioner of Highways shall have the
power to do all acts necessary or convenient for constructing, improving,
maintaining, and preserving the . . . operation of the highways . . . .”).
22. See Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 14 (contrasting, the court noted landowners have
a lesser duty, “to abstain from doing any act by which any part of the highway
would become more dangerous to the traveler than in a state of nature, or than
in the state in which the [public entity that maintains the highway] has left it”
(alteration added in Cline) (quoting Price v. Travis, 140 S.E. 644, 646 (Va. 1927))).
23. See Taylor v. City of Charlottesville, 397 S.E.2d 832, 836 (Va. 1990)
[I]t is said here that the hazardous situation arose not from any
condition in the streets themselves, but from a danger outside the
streets. We do not think the rule is so limited as to exclude all danger
arising beyond the limits of a street. The purpose of the rule is to
provide safety to persons lawfully using the streets. The rule, indeed,
would be but half discharged were it not held to make the municipality
liable for dangers known to exist outside the street’s limit, but so near
thereto as to endanger public travel thereon. It is as much the duty of
a city to take steps to ward off and to prevent the known probability of
injury to users of its streets as it is its duty to remove dangerous defects
and obstructions within the streets themselves.
(quoting Burson v. City of Bristol, 10 S.E.2d 541, 545 (Va. 1940)).
24. See Zook v. City of Norfolk, 87 Va. Cir. 47, No. CL12–4019, 2014 WL
3891750, at *3–5 (July 19, 2014) (finding that the City of Norfolk had duties under
its Charter, and that VDOT had the duty of reasonable care to maintain trees and
other natural vegetation adjacent to the roadway). Notably, the claim against the
Commonwealth and VDOT later failed on immunity grounds, as “[u]nder Cline v.
Dunlora, a private landowner does not owe a duty to protect travelers on an
adjoining public roadway from natural conditions on the landowner’s property.
Thus, the Commonwealth, if a private person, would not be liable . . . .” Id. at *5.
This Note will discuss the impact of sovereign immunity at greater length. Infra
Part IV.
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possible duty.25
B. Justification for Differing Liabilities Between
Road-Maintaining Entities and Private Landowners
Although Virginia law leaves open the possibility for the
imposition of a duty, the decision in Cline does little to explain why
the road-maintaining entity should bear the burden of liability but
leave the private landowner untouched.26 An examination of law
from other states, however, explains why such a distinction makes
sense.
Private landowners and road-maintaining entities play
different roles with respect to the roadway—this distinction is the
reason for asymmetric liability. In Ford v. South Carolina
Department of Transportation,27 the South Carolina Court of
Appeals found the Department of Transportation, rather than a
private landowner, liable for injuries resulting from a motorist
driving into a fallen tree.28 “Necessity” dictated that the private
rural landowner was not liable due to the disproportionate burden
liability would impose.29 Conversely, the court found that the
Department of Transportation could be liable for a tree in
25. But see infra notes 222–242 and accompanying text (reviewing the
Commonwealth’s opposition to a duty in Virginia). The Commonwealth’s position
is that a duty should not be imposed as a matter of policy and law, which will be
discussed later in this Note’s assessment of impact. Infra Part V.D.
26. See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text (detailing the state of the
law).
27. 492 S.E.2d 811 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997).
28. See id. at 812–13 (“Ford was driving south . . . when his car collided with
a tree that had fallen across the road. Mr. Ford’s car continued through the limbs
of the tree and then veered off to his left and down an embankment . . . . Mr. Ford
sustained severe head injuries and died as a result . . . .”).
29. See id. at 814 (“The rule of non-liability for natural conditions remains
to a considerable extent a necessity in rural communities, where the burden of
inspecting and improving the land is likely to be entirely disproportionate not
only to any threatened harm but even to the value of the land itself.”); see also id.
[A] landowner in a residential or urban area has a duty to others
outside the property to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm
from defective or unsound trees on the premises. Neither this
court nor the supreme court, however, has extended this duty to
an owner of trees of natural origin growing on rural,
undeveloped land . . . . We decline to extend the duty here.
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proximity to the highway.30 The court declared that liability
stemmed from “the Department’s duty to use reasonable care to
keep streets and highways within its control in a reasonably safe
condition for public travel.”31 Public responsibility gave the
Department of Transportation a higher duty of care than the
private landowners, “even [for] those obstructions originating on
private property.”32
Another justification is simply binary; if one party has a duty,
the other does not, and vice versa. The Supreme Court of
Minnesota remarked, “[t]he authorities chargeable with the
maintenance of streets and highways generally have been held to
the duty of protecting against dangers from falling trees and
branches. This negatives such duty on abutters or servient fee
owners.”33 In other words, casting the burden on the
road-maintaining entity suggests that the private landowner
should not be burdened with a duplicative, overlapping duty.34
This premise assumes that someone should be liable in order to
give effect to safety concerns via tort law.35
30.

See id.
[T]he Department of Transportation can be held liable for
damages caused by the fall of a tree standing within the limits
of or in close proximity to a public highway. Liability depends
on whether the Department knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have known, that the condition of the
tree would make it hazardous to persons or property in the
immediate vicinity.
31. Id. The court also noted that “even though a landowner is not liable to
persons travelling on adjacent highways for harm resulting from natural
conditions on land, the Department has the privilege to enter the land and do
what is necessary to remedy the harm . . . .” Id.
32. Id.
33. Zacharias v. Nesbitt, 185 N.W. 295, 296 (Minn. 1921).
34. See id. (establishing a rule of binary liability between road-maintaining
entities and private landowners).
35. See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both
Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1803–05 (1997)
(recounting the development of deterrence as a primary theory of tort law over
the decades). Tort law functions to deter negligent conduct via an economic
mechanism, and entities subject to tort duties have a strong incentive to fulfill
their obligations, lest they be subject to costs in the form of civil liability. See
Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Deterrence: The Legitimate Function of the Public Tort,
58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019, 1031 (2001) (“From an economic perspective, the
law ought to encourage people to act efficiently.”). “Forcing people to take account
of, or at least consider, all the costs of their proposed activity . . . will lead to
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The binary justification can be reconciled with the position
that liability should fall with the entity responsible for
maintaining the roadway. The Fourth Circuit noted in Chambers
v. Whelen36 that while the state of West Virginia had imposed a
statutory duty on road-maintainers to remove dead trees adjacent
to the roadway, no such duty had been imposed on landowners—a
binary conclusion.37 The court then declared,
This statutory policy touches, we think, the real heart of the
question. The inspection and removal of trees standing near a
highway is, in substance, not a matter affecting the use of the
abutting property, but a matter affecting the safety of the road.
While, of course, it is the duty of abutting owners not to create
or maintain upon their premises what may be a source of danger
to travelers on the highway, it is the duty of the highway
officials, and not the duty of abutting owners, to make the
highway safe for the use of the public; and the duty of inspection
would seem to rest upon those whose duty it is to make the
highway safe.38

As noted, Dunlora argued these points in Cline,39 but the court
did not address their merits. The court did recognize, however, the
fundamental difference between a road-maintaining entity’s
efficient investments in safety.” Id. Imposing a duty should “help to insure
efficient investments in safety if it can force actors to take account of costs they
would otherwise ignore because existing legal rules do not provide liability for
those costs.” Id. at 1031–32; see also id. at 1032 (“[T]he threat of paying [accident]
costs, is necessary to encourage efficient investments in safety.”). Although
deterrence theory is not without critiques of its own, see id. at 1033 (noting that
an issue with deterrence theory is that unless those injured pursue claims, the
economic incentive to invest in safety is lessened), liability is required in order to
make tort law an effective standard-bearer of safety. See id. at 1032 (“If legal rules
do not force a person to take account of all the costs of a particular action [or
inaction], then legal rules will not lead to efficient investments in safety.”).
Innocent drivers should not bear the burden when road-maintaining entities are
well-positioned to prevent the harm in the first place. See infra Part V.D (arguing
that road-maintaining entities should bear liability in Virginia).
36. 44 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1930).
37. See id. at 341 (recounting West Virginia’s statutory scheme).
38. Id. at 342. The court’s decision was limited to rural areas, in a similar
vein to Ford. See id. at 341 (limiting the question to “whether it is the duty of the
owner to inspect trees growing naturally upon rural lands”).
39. See Brief of Appellee at 8–19, Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC, 726 S.E.2d 14
(Va. 2012) (No. 110650), 2011 WL 9694959, at *7–18 (emphasizing the
road-maintaining entity’s statutory burden to maintain the safety of the roadway,
and embracing the policy argument of Whelen).

518

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 509 (2019)

responsibilities and a private landowner’s, as well as the statutory
burden on VDOT.40 Cline represents a foundation: it establishes
non-liability for the landowner while leaving open the possibility
of imposing a duty upon the road-maintaining entity.41 Imposing
that duty relies on recognizing a legal distinction between the two
actors,42 and it appears that the court may be willing to do so.43
40. See supra Part II.A (detailing Cline).
41. See Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC, 726 S.E.2d 14, 18 (Va. 2012)
It is well settled that public highways, whether they be in the country
or in the city, belong, not partially but entirely, to the public at large,
and that the supreme control over them is in the legislature. This
plenary power over the streets to a certain extent is conferred by the
legislature of the State upon the cities and towns thereof. . . . The duty
of the [public entity that maintains the highway] is to perform a
positive act in the preparation and preservation of a sufficient traveled
way. The duty of others is to abstain from doing any act by which any
part of the highway would become more dangerous to the traveler than
in a state of nature, or than in the state in which the [public entity that
maintains the highway] has left it.
(alteration added in Cline) (quoting Price v. Travis, 140 S.E. 644, 646 (Va. 1927)).
42. See supra notes 26–32, 36–38 and accompanying text (exploring the legal
differences between the roles of a private landowner and a road maintaining
entity). If the two roles were not legally distinct, Cline would control the outcome
of a claim against a road-maintaining entity either on the merits, or as a function
of sovereign immunity. See infra notes 126–134 (demonstrating how conflating
the two roles is fatal to a claim through sovereign immunity); Zook v. City of
Norfolk, 87 Va. Cir. 47, No. CL12–4019, 2014 WL 3891750, at *2 (July 19, 2014)
(“In support of their Demurrer, [both the Commonwealth and the City of Norfolk
have] cited Cline . . . and asserted that the Plaintiff’s cause of action is precluded
because there is ‘no legal duty to maintain any natural condition on land adjacent
to a roadway.’”).
43 See Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 18 (“The duty of the [public entity that maintains
the highway] is to perform a positive act in the preparation and preservation of a
sufficient traveled way. The duty of others is to abstain from doing any act by
which any part of the highway would become more dangerous . . . .” (alteration
added in Cline) (quoting Price v. Travis, 140 S.E. 644, 646 (Va. 1927))). Perhaps
to solidify the distinction, both the majority and dissent made clear that Cline
does not control for the purposes of road-maintaining entity liability. See id. at 18
n.6 (“The duty of VDOT or any other entity responsible for maintaining the safety
of the roadway presents a question not now before us.”); see also id. at 21 n.6
(Lemons, J., dissenting) (same). Given that three Justices voted in favor of
liability for the private landowner and that the majority opinion accepts a duty
for road-maintaining entities to perform positive acts with respect the roadway,
it appears that the court can rule in favor of liability for a road-maintaining
entity. See id. at 18 (identifying that a road-maintaining entity has a positive duty
to act); see also id. at 18–21 (Lemons, J., dissenting) (presenting the dissent in
favor of landowner duty from Justice Lemons, joined by Justices Mims and
Powell).
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III. How to Define the Scope of Duty
Although a duty imposed on the road-maintaining entity is
tenable, the work does not stop there; it remains to define the scope
of such a duty. Just as now-Chief Justice Lemons noted in his
dissent in Cline with respect to private landowners,44 a variety of
duties have developed in response to road-maintaining entity
liability. This Part considers these approaches before identifying
the best duty for Virginia.
A. Reviewing Out-of-State Duties for Road-Maintaining Entities
Many jurisdictions—regardless of whether they impose duties
on private landowners or road-maintaining entities—adopt duty
distinctions based upon a tree’s location.45 For example, the
“urban/rural” distinction posits that road-maintaining entities
have diminished duties of inspection with respect to trees located
in rural areas.46 The rationale for the distinction appears to be born
of practicality; the law hesitates to impose a duty on an entity that
is “unreasonable in comparison with the risk.”47 The doctrine can
be imprecise, however, as it can be difficult to determine whether
land is urban or rural.48
Other states focus more narrowly on the character and usage
of the road and surrounding land in question. In Hensley v.
Montgomery County,49 a Maryland court found that as a matter of
law, the duty of inspection required consideration of “the use of the
44. See Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 20 (Lemons, J., dissenting) (“Despite the
influence of the Restatement, across the jurisdictions addressing the liability of
landowners resulting from trees falling on public highways, multiple approaches
have developed.”).
45. See id. (Lemons, J., dissenting) (discussing the “urban/rural” distinction
for purposes of landowner duties across a number of jurisdictions).
46. See Commonwealth v. Callebs, 381 S.W.2d 623, 624 (Ky. 1964) (finding
that because an area was “not truly urban in character,” the law did not require
the Department of Highways to inspect for dangerous trees).
47. Id.
48. See id. at 624 (“Although the area may have been within the city limits
of Barbourville, it was not truly urban in character, and in the near vicinity there
were wooded hillsides along the road.”).
49. 334 A.2d 542 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975).
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road or population pressures of the countryside.”50 The court
reasoned that imposing a strict duty of inspection was
inappropriate because “[s]uch a duty would be far too great a
burden on the taxpayer when balanced against the purpose to be
served. There are still some natural dangers from which we cannot
rely upon the government for protection.”51 This line of reasoning
has also taken root in federal law.52 The advantage of such a
methodology is that an entity is not responsible for areas that
experience less traffic even if they are contained in the bounds of
an otherwise urban area.53 The drawback is that beyond an
internal determination of which areas are so populous as to require
inspection, a road-maintaining entity has no way to know
definitely, prior to court inquiry, where it must inspect for
dangerous trees.54 Furthermore, the character of a roadway and its
accompanying surroundings is subject to change, which can make
the job of determining where to inspect even more difficult.55
Perhaps as a means of curing doubt or promoting safety,
some states impose a duty to inspect regardless of the land or

50. Id. at 547.
51. Id.
52. See Husovsky v. United States, 590 F.2d 944, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
[T]he appropriate level of inspection and maintenance of a particular
roadway depends not only on the expense and burden of various
maintenance programs, but also on the characteristics of the
surrounding land and the roadway itself, including the type and extent
of dangers posed thereto. For instance, a seldom travelled roadway in
a national forest in a rural area would require fewer inspections and a
different type of maintenance than would a heavily travelled
thoroughfare in an urban area.
(citations omitted).
53. See Callebs, 381 S.W.2d at 624 (“Although the area may have been within
the city limits of Barbourville, it was not truly urban in character . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
54. See Husovsky, 590 F.2d at 950 (“Thus, we think it necessary first to
examine the particular situation presented in the case at bar in order to
determine the level of inspection and care which the District was obligated to
provide.”).
55. See Hensley, 334 A.2d at 547 (“Landowners would face nebulous
potential liability dependent rather upon the acts of others . . . than upon their
own actions. With the easy accessibility to open country provided by modern ways
of transportation an owner would be hard put to know what duties were imposed
upon him by that ownership.”).
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road’s character.56 This methodology can place a great burden on
the road-maintaining entity, however. As New York applies the
duty, entities face near-strict liability for injuries resulting from
trees falling into the roadway, provided the tree is visibly
decayed.57
Simply adopting one of the location-based duties is not enough
to define the full scope of a road-maintaining entity’s duty.58 The
entity must also know, beyond the locations it is responsible for,
the extent to which it must inspect those areas for dangerous
trees.59
The burden of inspection can be great if the road-maintaining
entity must perform walk-around inspections (by physically
walking around trees to inspect for danger) adjacent to the
roadway.60 Generally, windshield inspections (by inspecting trees
from a vehicle driving on the roadway) are “consistent
with . . . practices adopted by public entities charged with
monitoring trees abutting . . . highways or other public

56. See Jones v. State, 227 N.Y.S.2d 297, 299 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1962) (“It is well
established that the State is under a duty to make a reasonable inspection of trees
along its highways, and to trim and remove such trees or portions thereof which
constitute a danger to users of State highways.”); Mitchell v. State, 193 So.3d 152,
157. (La. Ct. App. 2016) (“The state’s duty with respect to its roadways is to
keep the road and its shoulders in a reasonably safe condition . . . . The state’s
duty is to inspect for dead trees and remove them within a reasonable time.”).
57. See Brown v. State, 58 N.Y.S.2d 691, 692–93 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1945)
The highway patrolmen were bound to perform their duties in a careful
and diligent manner, and had they done so in the present instance,
would have noticed the decayed condition of this large elm tree and of
its imminent danger to those using the highway. The failure of the
State’s employees to protect the public from such potential danger and
to give due and adequate warning thereof constitutes negligence. The
mere happening of the accident outside of the patrol period . . . is no
defense to this claim where the hazardous condition existed and the
State had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the same for many
years.
(citations omitted).
58. See supra notes 45–55 and accompanying text (reviewing location-based
duties).
59. See Husovsky, 590 F.2d at 950 (discussing “the appropriate level of
inspection and maintenance”).
60. See Commonwealth v. Callebs, 381 S.W.2d 623, 624 (Ky. 1964)
(considering whether the scope of inspection includes “a walk-around inspection
of each tree near the highway”).
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landscapes.”61 Imposing a walk-around duty as opposed to a
windshield-inspection duty places a significant, impractical
burden on the road-maintaining entity.62
Given that courts tend to weigh the balance of safety versus
practicality of implementation,63 it is reassuring to note that when
a duty to inspect is imposed, the tree’s appearance can instead
define the scope.64 Liability tends to focus on whether, by
reasonable inspection, the road-maintaining entity would have
discovered a tree’s defective condition.65 Even New York excuses
liability when reasonable inspection would fail to reveal a tree’s
rotting condition.66
In a related vein, the duty to inspect can be limited to
notice of danger as well. As the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
explained, “the state has a duty to inspect a tree on a public
right-of-way when it receives actual notice [of the tree’s] unsafe
condition . . . . [T]here is a difference between the state’s general
61. Baudouin v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., No. L-01368-10, L-10198-10, 2017 WL
1548708, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 1, 2017).
62. See id. (giving an example of an expert who, “kn[e]w of no utility or
highway department that expends the time and resources necessary to perform a
360 degree walk-around of every tree that could possibly impact a roadway”); see
also id. at *9 (observing that a walk-around inspection is unreasonable given the
Turnpike Authority’s total area and number of trees).
63. See Hensley v. Montgomery County, 334 A.2d 542, 547 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1975) (“Such a duty would be far too great a burden on the taxpayer
when balanced against the purpose to be served. There are still some natural
dangers from which we cannot rely upon the government for protection.”).
64. See Caskey v. Merrick Const. Co., 949 So.2d 560, 563 (La. Ct. App. 2007)
(“There is no duty requiring DOTD inspectors to walk around all sides of the tree
and check it for damage, particularly when the tree is otherwise green and
healthy.”).
65. See Carter v. Ga. Power Co., 418 S.E.2d 379, 380 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (“[A]
city has no duty to check limbs overhanging a public road for non-visible rot.”).
Reasonable inspection may also be related to an authority’s discretion for where
and how to implement safety programs. See Merando v. United States, 517 F.3d
160, 168–74 (3d Cir. 2008) (reviewing discretionary decisions related to a
windshield inspection program in Federal Tort Claims Act litigation). Discretion
will be discussed later with respect to sovereign immunity. Infra Parts IV.B–C.
66. Compare Mosher v. State, 77 N.Y.S.2d 643, 646–47 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1948)
(declining to impose liability where the evidence failed to show that a highway
inspection would have revealed the tree’s dangerous condition), with Messinger
v. State, 51 N.Y.S.2d 506, 507 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1944) (finding liability where the
highway patrol should have noticed tree’s defective condition if they had
performed “their duties in a diligent and thorough manner”).
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duty to inspect, which there is none, and . . . its receipt of actual
notice of a dangerous condition.”67
Instead of imposing bright line rules for where and how to
inspect for dangerous trees, an alternate theory of duty is that of
generalized reasonable care.68 As the Court of Appeals of South
Carolina articulates,
In South Carolina, as elsewhere, a public authority, such as the
Department, is liable for damages caused by the fall of a tree
standing within the limits of or in close proximity to its
highway, provided the public authority had notice, or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have been informed, that the
condition of the tree was such as to make it hazardous to
persons or property in the immediate vicinity.69

The duty considers the weight of the evidence to determine actual
or constructive notice that would lead to liability.70
An issue that impacts all of the duties previously discussed is
the ability of a road-maintaining entity to enter private land and
inspect or remedy dangerous trees. The Second Restatement of
Torts addresses the issue by allowing public authorities to enter
private land to remediate dangerous conditions adjacent to the
highway but does not address entities’ tort liability for those
conditions.71 Some courts have found that authorities own both the
privilege and a duty to inspect for and remove dangerous trees that

67. Comm. of Ky., Transp. Cabinet, Dept. of Highways v. Mechels,
No. 2010-CA-002279-MR, 2012 WL 333491, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb 3, 2012).
68. See Marsh v. S.C. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 380 S.E.2d 867, 868
(S.C. Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing a duty of reasonable care).
69. Id.
70. See id. at 869 (“This evidence, in our view, sufficiently establishes that
the Department in the exercise of reasonable care should have known of the
defective condition of the tree in question and of the danger it represented to
persons and property alike on Highway 41.”). Relevant evidence can include the
physical appearance of the tree and the maintenance routines of the entity. See
id. (reviewing evidence).
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 363 cmt. c (AM. LAW. INST. 1965)
The fact that a possessor of land is not subject to liability for natural
conditions . . . does not preclude the existence of a privilege on the part
of the authorities charged with the maintenance of the highway . . . to
enter the land and do such acts as are necessary for the termination of
the dangers which its natural condition involves.
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are located on private property adjacent to the roadway.72 This is
not a unanimous proposition, however.73
B. The Duty of Reasonable Care is the Best Duty for Virginia’s
Road-Maintaining Entities
The above review is certainly non-exhaustive but does
represent prevailing trends of law with respect to a
road-maintaining entity’s duties for trees adjacent to the
roadway.74 These doctrines serve to inform what duty would be
most appropriate in Virginia.
For the reasons set forth below, it seems apparent that the
most appropriate duty for road-maintaining entities is the

72. See, e.g., Husovsky v. United States, 590 F.2d 944, 947–48, 951–52 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (finding that the District of Columbia and the United States owed a
duty with respect to a tree located outside of the right-of-way of the road they
jointly maintained); Barron v. City of Natchez, 90 So.2d 673, 677 (Miss. 1956)
(finding that a municipality is liable for dangerous conditions adjacent to the
highway that may cause injury to travelers); City of Hattiesburg v. Hillman, 76
So.2d 368, 370 (Miss. 1954) (“[W]hile the title to trees standing in the neutral
ground is vested in the adjacent property owner, beyond doubt a municipality, in
the exercise of reasonable care . . . has the right and is under the duty to remove
them, if they are dangerous.”); Brown v. State, 58 N.Y.S.2d 691, 692 (N.Y. Ct. Cl.
1945) (“The fact that the trunks of the trees were located outside the highway
right of way is of no consequence . . . .”); Messinger v. State, 51 N.Y.S.2d 506, 507
(N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1944) (“We hold that the State is liable for allowing a condition to
exist which should have been observed . . . . The fact that the trunks of the trees
were outside of the highway right of way is no defense . . . .”); Inabinett v. State
Highway Dep’t, 12 S.E.2d 848, 851 (S.C. 1941) (finding that if a road-maintaining
entity knows of a dangerous condition on private land adjacent to the highway,
“it is its duty to enter upon the land and remove the danger”).
73. See Ortiz v. Jesus People, U.S.A., 939 N.E.2d 555, 565 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)
(“Here, the court properly ruled that the City did not owe a duty to maintain or
prevent injury from a tree on defendant’s private property.”); Estate of Durham
v. City of Amherst, 554 N.E.2d 945, 947–48 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (considering a
tree’s location on private property adjacent to the roadway, “[a]ppellant has failed
to persuade a majority of this court that the city of Dayton possesses a duty with
respect to property adjacent to the roadway”); Bowman v. Town of Granite Falls,
204 S.E.2d 239, 240 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974) (“The tree was in the area left by the
land developer for street purposes, but that part had not been accepted and was
still private property over which the city had no control and to which it owed no
duty.”).
74. See supra Part III.A (reviewing the imposition of duties on
road- maintaining entities).
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standard of reasonable care, exemplified by South Carolina.75 To
review, a road-maintaining entity would have a “duty to use
reasonable care to keep streets and highways within its control in
a reasonably safe condition for public travel.”76 Liability would
hinge “on whether the [road-maintaining entity] knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known, that the condition
of the tree would make it hazardous to persons or property in the
immediate vicinity.”77 This duty does not impose a strict duty to
inspect for dangerous trees; rather, determining if the duty to the
public is fulfilled depends in each case on a fact-based inquiry.78
The duty, as in South Carolina, would extend to dangerous
conditions on private property.79
A number of reasons suggest that this duty is most
appropriate for Virginia. First, the South Carolina scheme
operates concurrently with reduced liability for landowners.80
Although the scheme is not an exact analogue, the rationale for the
distinction is pertinent: because a road-maintaining entity is
responsible for a roadway’s safety, it follows that the entity has “a
higher duty of care than [do private landowners], to discover and
remedy potential obstructions, even those obstructions originating
on private property.”81 As mentioned above, the Supreme Court of
Virginia has embraced this distinction, as well as the idea that
dangerous conditions for which public authorities can be liable
may extend beyond the bounds of the physical roadway.82
75. See Ford v. S.C. Dept. of Transp., 492 S.E.2d 811, 814 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997)
(applying the duty of reasonable care).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 815 (“[W]e hold further inquiry into the facts is necessary to
determine whether or not the Department, had it adequately performed its duty
to the public, would have had notice of the potential hazard and the opportunity
to remedy the hazard.”).
79. See id. at 814 (“Moreover, even though a landowner is not liable to
persons travelling on adjacent highways for harm resulting from natural
conditions of the land, the Department has the privilege to enter the land and do
what is necessary to remedy the harm resulting from such natural conditions.”).
80. See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text (discussing differing
liabilities of landowners and road-maintaining entities).
81. Ford, 492 S.E.2d at 814; see also Part II.B (reviewing policy rationale for
separate liabilities).
82. See supra Part II (reviewing Virginia’s treatment of the distinction
between private landowners and road-maintaining entities); see also Cline v.
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Second, the Supreme Court of Virginia has noted the
legislative decision to place road-maintenance responsibilities in
the hands of the state road-maintaining entity as opposed to
another actor.83 This emphasis can be extended to other levels of
government as well—counties can adopt road responsibilities with
the creation of sanitary districts.84 Municipal entities may do so as
well through charters or other ordinances.85 Statutory evidence
largely supports the conclusion that road-maintaining entities are
the actors assigned responsibility—and the liability—as a matter
of legislative policy.86
Although these legislative decisions do not speak to private
road-maintaining entity liability,87 these actors are functionally
similar to public entities.88 Both the court and the legislature
Dunlora S., LLC, 726 S.E.2d 14, 18 (Va. 2012)
The duty of the [public entity that maintains the highway] is to perform
a positive act in the preparation and preservation of a sufficient
traveled way. The duty of others is to abstain from doing any act by
which any part of the highway would become more dangerous to the
traveler than in a state of nature . . . .
(alteration added in Cline) (quoting Price v. Travis, 140 S.E. 644, 646 (Va. 1927));
Taylor v. City of Charlottesville, 397 S.E.2d 832, 836 (Va. 1990) (“The rule is to
provide safety to persons lawfully using the streets. The rule, indeed, would be
but half discharged were it not held to make the municipality liable for dangers
known to exist outside the street’s limit, but so near thereto as to endanger public
travel thereon.”).
83. See Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 18 n.6 (“The General Assembly has vested the
Commissioner of Highways with the power to do all acts necessary for
maintaining and preserving state roads.”); see also General Powers of Comm’r of
Highways, VA. CODE ANN. § 33.2-223 (2018) (“[T]he Commissioner of Highways
shall have the power to do all acts necessary or convenient for constructing,
improving, maintaining, and preserving the . . . operation of the highways . . . .”).
84. See Certain Additional Powers of Governing Body, VA. CODE ANN.
§ 21-118.4(a) (2017) (“[W]hen an ordinance has been adopted creating a sanitary
district in such county, . . . the . . . governing body . . . shall have the following
powers and duties . . . [t]o construct, reconstruct, maintain, alter, improve, add to,
and operate . . streets . for the use and benefit of the public in such sanitary
district . . . .” (emphasis added)).
85. See Zook v. City of Norfolk, 87 Va. Cir. 47, No. CL12–4019, 2014 WL
3891750, at *3 (July 19, 2014) (“Thus, the Norfolk City Charter imposes a duty
on the City to prevent obstructions to Northampton Boulevard, and maintain
trees upon public grounds bordering the roadway . . . .”).
86 See supra notes 84–85 (compiling statutes).
87. See supra notes 84–85 (presenting statutes and judicial categorizations).
88. See supra Part II.B (discussing the role of the road-maintaining entity as
one of maintenance and safety); infra Part V.D (exploring the road-maintaining
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suggest that the duty lies with the entity in charge of the
preservation of the roadway,89 so there is little reason to develop a
separate duty based on private or public designation.
Third, the duty of reasonable care has garnered support in a
lower Virginia court. In Zook v. City of Norfolk,90 the circuit court
imposed a duty of reasonable care on the Commonwealth—and a
similar duty on the City of Norfolk—to maintain trees and other
vegetation adjacent to the roadway.91 The opinion referenced
Cline, statutory authority, and out-of-state law (including a
positive citation to South Carolina’s duty scheme).92 Although
circuit court opinions are not binding authority,93 it is persuasive
that one Virginia court interprets Cline to be consistent with
imposing a duty of reasonable care on road-maintaining entities.94
Finally, Justice Lemons supported the duty of reasonable care
for landowners in his dissent to Cline, which Justices Mims and
Powell joined.95 His theory of the case did not win the day, but
combining his methodology of out-of-state review with the
majority’s treatment of public entities lends support to this Note’s
argument to establish the duty of reasonable care for
road-maintaining entities.96
entity’s ability to promote safety in Virginia); see also infra notes 121–123 and
accompanying text (explaining the functional similarities in the context of
sovereign immunity).
89. See supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text (reviewing justifications
for road-maintaining entity liability generally). Private liability is significant in
the context of the Virginia Tort Claims Act, which will be discussed when
considering the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity. Infra Part IV.B.1.
90. 87 Va. Cir. 47, No. CL12–4019, 2014 WL 3891750 (July 19, 2014).
91. See id. at *3, 5 (applying the duty of reasonable care to VDOT and the
City of Norfolk).
92. See id. at *2–5 (basing the decision on the authorities mentioned in-text).
93. See Burkholder v. McGraw, 63 Va. Cir. 537, No. CH03000393, 2003 WL
23146217, at *2 n.3 (Dec. 31, 2003) (“While circuit court opinions do not have the
force of binding precedents, they can have . . . great persuasive authority.”).
94. See Zook, 2014 WL 3891750, at *3 (specifically noting consistency with
Cline before determining that “Plaintiff has alleged a sufficient cause of action for
negligence against the City”).
95. See Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC, 726 S.E.2d 14, 20–21 (Va. 2012) (Lemons,
J., dissenting) (“Considering the various approaches to liability arising from trees
adjacent to roadways in concert with . . . longstanding negligence
principles . . . we should recognize a general duty of reasonable care applicable in
all such cases.”).
96. See Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 19–21 (Lemons, J., dissenting) (reviewing

528

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 509 (2019)

Justice Lemons’ rationale also informs why the South
Carolinian duty of reasonable care is most appropriate. He
explicitly rejected the duty to inspect for dangerous trees97 and
noted that “it is unreasonable to impose the same expectations
upon the owners of . . . rural . . . or forested tracts of land as that
imposed upon the owner of a single lot in an unforested urban
area . . . .”98 For the issue of constructive notice, he called for a
fact-based inquiry, relying on factors such as “the character of the
land, the nature and frequency of the landowner’s use, the outward
appearance of the tree, and whether persons noticed and notified
the owner of the condition of the tree.”99 His opinion shows a
concern for flexibility and reasonableness with respect to liability;
the general duty of reasonable care South Carolina imposes
addresses these same concerns.100 Issues relating to a tree’s
location and outward appearance, as well as issues concerning the
frequency of motorist travel through the surrounding area are not
unique to private landowner liability.101 They should be given the
same respect when liability is imposed on road-maintaining
entities instead.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has yet to see a case that
demands a ruling on a road-maintaining entity’s duty with respect
to trees adjacent to the roadway. If, and when, a duty is imposed,
out-of-state cases to find a proper liability rule); id. at 18 (“The duty of the [public
entity that maintains the highway] is to perform a positive act in the preparation
and preservation of a sufficient traveled way. The duty of others is to abstain from
doing any act by which any part of the highway would become more
dangerous . . . .” (alteration added in Cline) (quoting Price v. Travis, 140 S.E. 644,
646 (Va. 1927))).
97. See Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 21 (Lemons, J., dissenting) (“We should decline
to impose a duty to inspect trees for defects . . . .”).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text (reviewing the South
Carolinian regime). South Carolina also operates under a similar sovereign
immunity waiver as Virginia does, demonstrating that the duty is workable under
a similar statutory regime. See infra notes 166–167 and accompanying text
(comparing the two immunity waiver statutes). Sovereign immunity is the focus
of the next Part. Infra Part IV.
101. See Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 20 (Lemons, J., dissenting) (reviewing issues
relating to imposing liability and out-of-state approaches to duty); supra Part
III.A (reviewing out-of-state duties and their efforts to grapple with the same
issues).
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however, the duty of reasonable care seems to best comport with
existing Virginia law.102

IV. Sovereign Immunity and its Relationship to
Road-Maintaining Entities
Even if a duty of reasonable care exists, immunity principles
potentially mute its force. This Part first explores the conceptual
background of sovereign immunity, and then assesses how the
doctrine may impact the tort duty this Note advocates.103
A. A Brief Review of Sovereign Immunity in Virginia
In Virginia, “the doctrine of sovereign immunity is ‘alive and
well . . . . ”104 In function, sovereign immunity is simple—it bars
claims against the state in tort.105 The Supreme Court of Virginia
catalogs a non-exhaustive list of reasons for the doctrine:
protecting the public purse, providing for smooth operation of
government, eliminating public inconvenience and danger that
might spring from officials being fearful to act, assuring that
citizens will be willing to take public jobs, and preventing
102. See supra notes 80–96 (reviewing rationale specific to Virginia). For some
of these arguments in the context of appellate litigation, see Brief of Appellee at
8–19, Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC, 726 S.E.2d 14 (Va. 2012) (No. 110650), 2011 WL
9694959, at *7–18 (detailing rationale for state liability with respect to dangerous
conditions adjacent to the roadway).
103. Infra Parts IV.A–D. Although similar to sovereign immunity, this Note
will not discuss the public-duty doctrine. The public-duty doctrine bars negligence
claims against public officials if the duty was owed to the public, as opposed to a
particular individual. See Commonwealth v. Burns, 639 S.E.2d 276, 278 (Va.
2007) (describing the public duty doctrine). The Supreme Court of Virginia has
limited the doctrine to “cases when a public official owed a duty to control the
behavior of a third party, and the third party committed acts of assaultive
criminal behavior upon another.” Id. This limitation exists expressly due to
sovereign immunity: “We hold that the expansion of the public duty doctrine is
unnecessary because Virginia’s sovereign immunity doctrine provides sufficient
protection to . . . employees in the discharge of their public duties.” Id. at 279. As
such, this Note will focus on sovereign immunity.
104. Messina v. Burden, 321 S.E.2d 657, 660 (Va. 1984).
105. See id. (“One of the most often repeated explanations for the rule of state
immunity from suits in tort is the necessity to protect the public purse.”).
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citizens from improperly influencing the conduct of
governmental affairs through the threat or use of vexatious
litigation.106

Immunity is not limited to public bodies themselves; the
doctrine can also protect public employees.107 “The reason for this
is plain: the State can act only through individuals.”108 Thus, tort
liability must be reconciled with sovereign immunity for the
liability to have any teeth.109
B. A Public Entity’s Sovereign Immunity in Virginia
Sovereign immunity’s protection in Virginia is different
depending on the type of governmental entity at issue. The Part
now considers sovereign immunity as it affects the
Commonwealth,110 counties of the Commonwealth,111 and
municipalities within the Commonwealth.112
1. The Commonwealth of Virginia’s Immunity Under the Virginia
Tort Claims Act
For the Commonwealth, “[i]n the absence of statute, an action
of tort for injuries from defective highways cannot be maintained
against the state.”113 The Virginia Tort Claims Act (VTCA)114

106. Id.
107. See id. at 660–61 (“Given the several purposes of the doctrine, it follows
that in order to fulfill those purposes the protection afforded by the doctrine
cannot be limited solely to the sovereign.”).
108. Id. at 661.
109. See Whitley v. Commonwealth, 538 S.E.2d 296, 302 (Va. 2000) (“A plea
of sovereign immunity is a defensive plea presenting distinct issues of fact, which,
if proved, create a bar to the plaintiff’s right of recovery.”); see also Zook v. City of
Norfolk, 87 Va. Cir. 47, No. CL12–4019, 2014 WL 3891750, at *5–6 (July 19, 2014)
(granting the Commonwealth’s plea of sovereign immunity in tort action
involving a falling tree).
110. Infra Part IV.B.1.
111. Infra Part IV.B.2.
112. Infra Part IV.B.3.
113. Mann v. Cty. Bd., 98 S.E.2d 515, 518 (Va. 1957).
114. Virginia Tort Claims Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (2014).
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expressly waives the Commonwealth’s immunity in certain
cases.115 The VTCA reads:
[T]he Commonwealth shall be liable for claims for money . . . on
account of damage to or loss of property or personal injury or
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee while acting within the scope of his employment
under circumstances where the Commonwealth or
transportation district, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant for such damage, loss, injury, or death.116

Per the statutory waiver, the Commonwealth may be liable in tort
only if a private person would be liable in an identical action.117 In
addition, the VTCA provides a number of exceptions to the waiver,
the exception most relevant to this discussion being “[a]ny claim
based upon . . . the legislative function of any agency subject to the
provisions of this article.”118
The critical aspects of the statute are thus: the Commonwealth
may be liable in tort only if, (1) the private-person clause is met;
and (2) if the action falls outside of the statutory exceptions to the
immunity waiver.119
The private-person clause presents two challenges of its own
with respect to the application of a duty of reasonable care: first, a
private person charged with maintaining the roadway must be
115. See id. (waiving immunity).
116. Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court of Virginia maintains that
because the statute is a “derogation of the common law, its waiver of immunity
must be strictly construed.” Maddox v. Commonwealth, 594 S.E.2d 567, 569 (Va.
2004). The statute does not waive immunity for agencies of the Commonwealth
(such as VDOT); actions arising from a state agency’s negligence must be brought
against the Commonwealth. See The Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va. v.
Carter, 591 S.E.2d 76, 78 (2004) (“As an agency of the Commonwealth, UVA is
entitled to sovereign immunity under the common law absent an
express . . . provision to the contrary . . . . The [VTCA’s] waiver of the
Commonwealth’s immunity would make the Commonwealth both a property
party, and given UVA’s immunity, a necessary party . . . .”).
117. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (waiving immunity). Damages are
limited to $100,000, or to “the maximum limits of any liability policy maintained
to insure against such negligence or other tort, if such policy is in force at the time
of the act or omission complained of, whichever is greater, exclusive of interest
and costs.” Id.
118. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3(2).
119. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (waiving immunity in instances where a
private actor would be liable in tort, and providing a number of exceptions to
liability).

532

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 509 (2019)

liable for negligent maintenance and, second, a government
road-maintaining entity must not occupy the same role as the
private landowner in Cline.120 Each will be discussed in turn.
This Note has previously discussed the proposition that a
private individual in the role of a road-maintaining entity could be
subject to the same legal duties as proposed for public entities.121
It bears repeating that when a private individual undertakes the
role of a road-maintaining entity, he works to fulfill the same role
that a public entity would: “the preparation and preservation of a
sufficient traveled way.”122 If he did so negligently, the asserted
duty of reasonable care should apply.123 The Supreme Court of
Virginia relies on case law to determine the appropriate standard
of care for private individuals in the context of VTCA litigation,124
so the observations made by this Note can serve as the primary
justification for a duty applied to all road-maintaining entities.125
As a second prong, a road-maintaining entity—regardless of
land ownership—is different than a private landowner who does
not maintain a road.126 In Zook, the court expressly invoked the
private-person aspect of the statute in order to grant the
Commonwealth immunity for the situation where a tree located on
Commonwealth property fell into the roadway and injured a
traveler.127 Applying the VTCA, the court stated:
120. See supra notes 115–29 and accompanying text (detailing the VTCA); see
also infra notes 127–130 (presenting the Zook treatment of Cline).
121. See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text (reviewing proposition
that duty could apply to private entities).
122. Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC, 726 S.E.2d 14, 18 (Va. 2012).
123. See, e.g., Bragg v. United States, 741 S.E.2d 90, 100 (W. Va. 2013)
(considering the private-person clause in context of the Federal Tort Claims Act
through assessing whether or not a private person would be liable for the
negligent inspection of a worksite).
124. See Commonwealth v. Coolidge, 379 S.E.2d 338, 340 (Va. 1989) (“We
construe Code § 8.01-195.3 as a limited waiver of governmental immunity from
tort claims, not as a legislative definition of the Commonwealth’s duty of care to
those with claims against it. We believe the legislature intended existing case law
to govern the appropriate standard of care.”).
125. See supra Parts II–III, V.D (outlining reasons for the imposition of a duty
of reasonable care for road-maintaining entities as a matter of law and policy).
126. See Zook v. City of Norfolk, 87 Va. Cir. 47, No. CL12–4019, 2014 WL
3891750, at *5 (July 19, 2014) (declaring that under Cline, a private person would
not be liable as to justify Commonwealth immunity).
127. See id. at *2, *5 (detailing facts and granting the Commonwealth’s plea
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Under Cline v. Dunlora, a private landowner does not owe a duty to
protect travelers on an adjoining public roadway from natural
conditions on the landowner’s property. Thus, the Commonwealth, if a
private person, would not be liable to the Plaintiff. Given that the
Commonwealth has not waived their sovereign immunity, the Court
will grant the Commonwealth’s Special Plea of Sovereign Immunity.128

This private-person application is particularly relevant to the
immunity question, given that the Commonwealth can own
right-of-way properties adjacent to the roadway.129
Zook used the Cline rule, “a private landowner does not owe a
duty to protect travelers on an adjoining public roadway from
natural conditions on the landowner’s property,”130 to immunize
the Commonwealth by conflating road-maintaining entities and
private landowners. This rule, however, says nothing with respect
to a road-maintaining entity’s liability,131 so it was inappropriate
to grant immunity by way of analogy. Cline was clear that “[t]he
duty of VDOT or any other entity responsible for maintaining the
safety of the roadway presents a question not now before us.”132 The
holding is relevant only to the situation where a private landowner
abuts a roadway that he does not maintain.133 Cline does not
preclude imposing a duty on a road-maintaining entity that owns
land adjacent to the road it maintains, due to the fundamental
of sovereign immunity).
128. Id. at *5.
129. See VA. CODE ANN. § 33.2-1001(A) (2014) (“The Commissioner of
Highways is vested with the power to acquire . . . such lands . . . [and]
rights-of-way . . . deemed necessary for the construction, reconstruction,
alteration, maintenance, and repair of the public highways of the
Commonwealth . . . .”).
130. Zook, 2014 WL 3891750, at *5.
131. See, e.g., Shenk v. Spangler, 46 Va. Cir. 277, No. 10925, 10926, 1998 WL
34180215, at *4 (July 31, 1998) (granting immunity because private persons are
not responsible for training or determining who drives a police cruiser). The
VTCA will waive immunity unless the duty of reasonable care is rejected, or if
government road maintenance is considered a legally distinct act from private
road maintenance. See id. (“Because of the unique nature of the activity engaged
in by the Commonwealth in determining to whom to supply law enforcement
vehicles, this is not an activity for which a private person could be liable, so the
Commonwealth has not waived its immunity for this governmental activity.”).
132. Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC, 726 S.E.2d 14, 18 n.6 (Va. 2012) (emphasis
added).
133. See id. at 18 (finding that landowners do not owe a duty to protect
travelers on an adjoining roadway).
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difference the case recognizes between a landowner and a
road-maintaining entity’s responsibility with respect to roadway
safety.134 Basing the standard on land ownership while ignoring
responsibility for the roadway actually creates a poor result—the
Commonwealth would have been liable for the injury in Zook but
for the fact that it happened to own the land from which the tree
fell.135
Even if the private-person clause is satisfied, a plaintiff must
still address the VTCA exception “for any act or omission in the
exercise of the legislative function of an agency of the
Commonwealth.”136 The Supreme Court of Virginia has used the
distinction between the governmental and proprietary functions of
municipalities as the basis for concluding whether an act is
legislative in character.137 The court, however, generally looks at
whether or not the Commonwealth must “determine whether
public funds should be expended” as a test for resolving the
issue.138 This is a fact-dependent analysis, but the Supreme Court
of Virginia has found using this test that “[t]he decision not to
remove [a] tree” adjacent to the roadway was not a legislative
function, and in that case declined to grant the Commonwealth
immunity.139 Without engaging in any hypotheticals, it is evident
134. See id. (“The duty of the [public entity that maintains the highway] is to
perform a positive act in the preparation and preservation of a sufficient traveled
way. The duty of others is to abstain from doing any act by which any part of the
highway would become more dangerous . . .” (alteration added in Cline) (quoting
Price v. Travis, 140 S.E. 644, 646 (Va. 1927))). For example, if Dunlora was the
road-maintaining entity as well as the abutting landowner in the original Cline
case, it would have been liable in its road-maintaining entity capacity, but not in
its capacity as a private landowner. See supra notes 130–134 and accompanying
text (drawing a distinction between the two roles); see also supra Part II.B
(reviewing policy reasons for differing liabilities between the two roles).
135. See Zook v. City of Norfolk, 87 Va. Cir. 47, No. CL12–4019, 2014 WL
3891750, at *4– 5 (July 19, 2014) (finding the Commonwealth liable under a duty
of reasonable care, but granting sovereign immunity on the basis of land
ownership).
136. Maddox v. Commonwealth, 594 S.E.2d 567, 569 (Va. 2004); see also
Virginia Tort Claims Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (2007) (listing exceptions).
137. See Maddox, 594 S.E.2d at 570 (using municipal case law rationale to
resolve the legislative function question). This distinction will be discussed in
greater detail in the context of municipal immunity. Infra Part IV.B.3.
138. Cline v. Commonwealth, No. 151037, 2016 WL 4721393, at *2 (Va. Sept.
8, 2016).
139. Id.
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that tree maintenance can fall outside the scope of a legislative
function and defeat a claim of sovereign immunity, based on prior
rulings.140
2. A County’s Absolute Immunity in Tort
The VTCA neither applies to nor limits county sovereign
immunity.141 The sovereign immunity of counties is thus
equivalent to that of the Commonwealth—waivable only by
statute.142 The statute must furthermore explicitly waive county
immunity—waiver by implication is insufficient.143 Although
counties may be held liable in contract, they have yet to be stripped
of sovereign immunity in tort.144 Thus, absent legislative action,
counties will not be liable for failing to properly maintain
roadways, even if Virginia adopts the duty of reasonable care for
road-maintaining entities.145

140. See Vivian v. Honda Motor Co., 64 Va. Cir. 297, No. 205401, 2004 WL
835985,
at
*2
(Mar.
31,
2004)
(determining
that
while
a
negligent-maintenance-of-the-roadway claim was permissible, negligent
planning or design fell within the legislative-function exception).
141. Virginia Tort Claims Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (2014) (“[N]or shall
any provision of this article be applicable to any county . . . or be so construed as
to remove or in any way diminish the sovereign immunity of any county . . . in the
Commonwealth.”).
142. See Mann v. County Bd., 98 S.E.2d 515, 518 (Va. 1957) (“[I]n the absence
of . . . statutory provisions imposing liability, . . . a county is not liable for
personal injuries caused by the negligence of its officers, agents or
employees. . . . [N]o liability is incurred by a county for
injuries resulting from
negligent construction, maintenance or operation of its streets, roads and
highways.”). The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed that counties share
Commonwealth immunity post-VTCA. See Messina v. Burden, 321 S.E.2d 657,
664 (Va. 1984) (citing Mann for the principle of county immunity); see also
Virginia Tort Claims Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (2014) (“Subject to the
provisions of this article, the Commonwealth shall be liable for claims for money
only accruing on or after July 1, 1982 . . . .”).
143. See Seabolt v. County of Albemarle, 724 S.E.2d 715, 718 (Va. 2012)
(demanding explicit waiver of immunity by statute in order for a county to be
liable in tort).
144. See id. (reviewing county liability in contract, and immunity in tort).
145. See supra notes 141–144 and accompanying text (explaining the state of
county immunity in the Commonwealth).
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3. Cities and Municipalities in Virginia: A Governmental or
Proprietary Distinction
Municipal corporations, like towns and cities, enjoy a lessened
degree of immunity; while governmental acts are protected,
proprietary acts are not.146 Governmental actions are those that
entail “the exercise of an entity’s political, discretionary, or
legislative authority” and are performed “exclusively for the public
welfare.”147 In contrast, proprietary functions are those that “are
performed primarily for the benefit of the municipality” and are
unprotected “[i]f the function is a ministerial act and involves no
discretion.”148 The maintenance function of a municipality falls
under the proprietary category, and is thus unprotected.149
In order for the proposed duty to defeat sovereign immunity,
tree removal adjacent to the roadway must be categorized as a
proprietary function.150 Burnson v. City of Bristol151 provides
resolution in the affirmative:
In this State, we have long determined the liability or
non-liability of a city for acts committed by it according to
whether the act was done in its governmental or proprietary
character. If the act be done in carrying out a governmental
function, the city is not liable; if it be done in the exercise of
some power of a private, proprietary or ministerial nature, the
146. See City of Chesapeake v. Cunningham, 604 S.E.2d 420, 426–27 (Va.
2004) (“Sovereign immunity protects municipalities from tort liability arising
from the exercise of governmental functions. There is no municipal immunity,
however, in the exercise of proprietary functions.” (citations omitted)). The VTCA
is inapplicable to these state actors. See Virginia Tort Claims Act, VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-195.3 (2014) (“[N]or shall any provision of this article be applicable to
any . . . city or town in the Commonwealth or be so construed as to remove or in
any way diminish the sovereign immunity of any . . . city or town . . . .”).
147. Cunningham, 604 S.E.2d at 426.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 427 (collecting cases for the rule that routine maintenance is
proprietary, specifically with respect to maintaining sidewalks, streets, and
sewers). The distinction can prove to be challenging, however, as “[a]lthough the
principles for differentiating governmental and proprietary functions are easily
recited,” the Supreme Court of Virginia notes that the “application of these
principles ‘has occasioned much difficulty.’” Carter v. Chesterfield Cty. Health
Comm’n, 527 S.E.2d 783, 785 (Va. 2000).
150. See Cunningham, 604 S.E.2d at 426 (reviewing immunity in the context
of municipalities).
151. 10 S.E.2d 541 (Va. 1940).
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city is liable. . . . In the instant case, the application of the
general principle is not difficult. This court has consistently
held that the duty of a city to keep and maintain its streets in
repair and in a safe condition for travel, free from defects and
obstructions, is a ministerial duty. But it is said here that the
hazardous situation arose not from any condition in the streets
themselves, but from a danger outside the streets. We do not
think the rule is so limited as to exclude all danger arising
beyond the limits of a street. The purpose of the rule is to
provide safety to persons lawfully using the streets. The rule,
indeed, would be but half discharged were it not held to make
the municipality liable for dangers known to exist outside the
street’s limit, but so near thereto as to endanger public travel
thereon. It is as much the duty of a city to take steps to ward off
and to prevent the known probability of injury to users of its
streets as it is its duty to remove dangerous defects and
obstructions within the streets themselves.152

The court found not only that keeping streets in a safe condition
was a proprietary function but also that the principle and liability
extended to dangers beyond the roadway as well.153
Although tree removal adjacent to the roadway can be a
proprietary function under Burnson, that by itself may not defeat
immunity. If the governmental and proprietary functions collide in
a negligence action, the governmental function will override and
grant immunity.154 Thus, if a municipality’s failure to create and
deploy a maintenance system (that would have otherwise given the
municipality constructive or actual notice of a tree’s dangerous
condition) formed the basis of a suit, it is conceivable that
sovereign immunity would be granted.155 In the alternative, if the
152. Id. at 545 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
153. See id. (establishing the rule that roadway maintenance is proprietary,
and that the responsibility is not to be taken so literally such that liability would
stop at the curb).
154. See Woods v. Town of Marion, 425 S.E.2d 487, 489 (Va. 1993) (declining
to grant immunity in the case of two alleged ministerial acts because immunity
was only applicable if one of the acts was governmental).
155. See City of Chesapeake v. Cunningham, 604 S.E.2d 420, 426–27 (Va.
2004) (explaining that planning or provision of services is governmental and
entitled to immunity). For an example of such a program, see Landscape
Management, CITY NORFOLK, https://www.norfolk.gov/index.aspx?nid=1224 (last
visited Jan. 28, 2019) (detailing city’s tree removal program for city owned trees,
“[t]he main priority of the city’s tree management is public safety, therefore those
trees posing an immediate safety concern are prioritized first” using a rating
scale) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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municipality did implement such a maintenance program it would
be liable only if the maintenance was performed negligently.156
C. Employees Have Limited Immunity
Employees of a public body have a somewhat lessened
standard of immunity compared to governmental entities.
Employees at each level of government discussed above enjoy
sovereign immunity on a case-by-case basis.157 In an effort to
determine whether or not an employee is entitled to immunity, the
Supreme Court of Virginia devised a four-part test, looking at: “1.
the nature of the function performed by the employee; 2. the extent
of the state’s interest and involvement in the function; 3. the
degree of control and direction exercised by the state over the
employee; and 4. whether the act complained of involved the use of
judgment and discretion.”158 This is a fact-dependent analysis,
reliant on the individual job of the employee and the form of alleged
negligence.159
Conceivably, an employee would be immune from suit if he
were a supervisor in charge of directing road crews that might
156. See, e.g., Cline v. Commonwealth, No. 151037, 2016 WL 4721393, at *2
(Va. Sept. 8, 2016)
Cline alleges that the Commonwealth was negligent in failing to
remove the tree that injured him after it assumed a duty to remediate
dangerous conditions existing in its right-of-way. More
specifically, Cline asserts that its employee, Mayo, “noticed the tree
and the dangerous condition presented by it,” but “mistakenly believed
the tree was not located within the Commonwealth’s right of way” and
“chose not to have it removed.”
See also Cunningham, 604 S.E.2d at 427 (“[R]outine maintenance . . . is
proprietary.”).
157. See Lohr v. Larsen, 431 S.E.2d 642, 645 (Va. 1993) (asserting employee
immunity for discretionary acts within the scope of employment, but holding
employees liable for ministerial acts); Messina v. Burden, 321 S.E.2d 657, 663
(Va. 1984) (describing factors to be considered for determining employee
entitlement to immunity); see also McBride v. Bennett, 764 S.E.2d 44, 46 (Va.
2014) (applying the four-part immunity test to the case of a municipal employee’s
simple negligence).
158. Messina, 321 S.E.2d at 663.
159. See id. at 664 (applying the four-part test). For a more detailed
application, see Pike v. Hagaman, 787 S.E.2d 89, 92–94 (Va. 2016) (providing
detailed analysis and application of the four-part test in the context of medical
negligence).
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discover and cut down dangerous trees due to the discretion
involved.160 On the other hand, an employee would likely not be
granted immunity if his job entailed inspecting a specific stretch of
roadway for dangerous trees, had actual or constructive notice of a
tree’s dangerous condition during an inspection, and subsequently
failed to act.161 In many ways these results mirror the discussion
regarding municipal corporations, granting immunity only where
discretion exists.162 An employee’s immunity is important in the
context of this Note because a plaintiff might sue an employee in
order to bypass a public entity’s sovereign immunity.163
D. Limiting Sovereign Immunity’s Impact by Statute
Although the present state of sovereign immunity presents
some difficulties,164 there is still a mode of recourse. A statutory
160. See Stanfield v. Peregoy, 429 S.E.2d 11, 13 (Va. 1993) (finding that a
snow plow operator enjoyed immunity because he used discretion to decide what
streets needed to be plowed, how to plow and salt the streets, and “to undertake
the plowing and salting at all”).
161. See Habib v. Blanchard, 25 Va. Cir. 451, No. 99371, 1991 WL 835292, at
*2 (Nov. 13, 1991) (denying immunity to employees who had actual notice of a
defective road condition on the shoulder and failed to order repairs because “the
actions . . . involved no discretion on their part. Their responsibility was clearly
ministerial in nature”).
162. Supra Part IV.B.3.
163. See supra Part IV.B.2 (exemplifying the difficulty of suing counties in
tort). Many public entities provide civil liability insurance for their employees,
which plaintiffs can use as a means of recovery if the public entity is immune from
suit in tort. See, e.g., FAIRFAX COUNTY, 2016 FAIRFAX COUNTY LINES OF BUSINESS:
COUNTY INSURANCE 1449 (2016), https://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/budget/sites/
budget/files/assets/documents/fy2016/lobs/60000.pdf (describing County risk
management for claims arising from public official liability); GREG KAMPTNER,
THE ALBEMARLE COUNTY LAND USE LAW HANDBOOK § 31-500 (2018),
http://www.albemarle.org/upload/images/Forms_Center/Departments/County_At
torney/Forms/LUchapter31-liability.pdf (listing employee insurance coverage
policies for those employees “acting in an authorized governmental or proprietary
capacity and within the course and scope of employment or authorization”).
Furthermore, the VTCA can limit a plaintiff’s damages, so alternate recovery may
be preferable. See Virginia Tort Claims Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (2014)
(“[A]mount
recoverable
by
any
claimant
shall
not
exceed . . . $100,000 . . . or . . . the maximum limits of any liability policy
maintained to insure against such negligence or other tort . . . whichever is
greater . . . .”).
164. See, e.g., supra notes 141–145, 149 and accompanying text (identifying
challenges relating to a county’s immunity in tort, and the difficulty of
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waiver could make an exception to immunity for negligent
maintenance of the roadway.165 South Carolina operates under a
similar immunity waiver as Virginia does with the VTCA,166 yet
carves out a specific exception for negligent roadway
maintenance.167 Such a waiver in Virginia would solve the issue of
immunity blocking claims, as it places liability directly in the
hands of the entity responsible for roadway maintenance.168 This
form of waiver would also solve two larger issues with respect to
immunity: the present absolute immunity of counties169 and the
disincentive for municipalities to establish maintenance programs
that would potentially expose them to liability (by removing
immunity considerations from the decision to establish a
maintenance program; substituting with liability premised upon
negligence coupled with actual or constructive notice).170 This is
not to say that a statutory waiver is required to give effect to the
duty of reasonable care under the present state of the law—only
determining whether an act is governmental or proprietary for purposes of
municipal immunity).
165. See, e.g., supra Part IV.B.1–2 (reviewing statutory waiver and lack
thereof in the context of the Commonwealth and counties).
166. See South Carolina Tort Claims Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-40 (1986)
(“The State, an agency, a political subdivision, and a governmental entity are all
liable for their torts in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances . . . .”).
167. See South Carolina Tort Claims Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(15)
(2010) (“Governmental entities responsible for maintaining highways . . . are not
liable for loss arising out of a defect . . . caused by a third party unless the defect
or condition is not corrected by the particular governmental entity responsible for
the maintenance within a reasonable time after actual or constructive notice.”).
168. See id. (waiving immunity for the governmental entity in the event of
negligent roadway maintenance).
169. See supra Part IV.B.2 (reviewing county immunity).
170. See supra notes 154–156 and accompanying text (presenting
hypotheticals for municipal liability); supra note 167 and accompanying text
(providing the South Carolinian statute for functional purposes). In spite of this
apparent disincentive, there are examples of such programs in use. See, e.g.,
Landscape Management, supra note 155 (presenting the City of Norfolk’s
maintenance program); Landscape Management, CITY OF VA. BEACH,
https://www.vbgov.com/government/departments/parks-recreation/parkstrails/Pages/landscape-management.aspx (last visited Jan. 28, 2019) (noting that
“[t]he Landscape Management Division is responsible for all landscaping and
grounds maintenance of City . . . roadways,” including services such as
“[h]azardous tree assessment and removal”) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Law Review).
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that one is necessary to give the duty uniform effect across
Virginia’s levels of government.171
Sovereign immunity limits the duty this Note proposes by
immunizing certain governmental bodies, employees, and
discretionary activities from liability172 but is certainly not fatal to
the duty’s application.173 This is not unexpected or unwelcome;
sovereign immunity is a vital aspect of maintaining uninterrupted
effective governance.174 In true cases of negligence, however, it is
reassuring to note that sovereign immunity in its present state
may not serve as an uncompromising bar to a plaintiff’s potential
recovery (excluding actions against counties).175
V. Impact of Tort Liability for Road-Maintaining Entities
This Part focuses on the anticipated impacts of the proposed
duty of reasonable care with respect to roadway-adjacent trees for
road-maintaining entities. Beyond the obvious goal of increasing
safety for motorists on the roadway, this Part examines the impact
the duty of reasonable care might have on gross negligence176 and
assumption-of-duty claims177 arising out of negligent maintenance
of the roadway. In addition, this Part will consider the applicability
of the duty of reasonable care to situations involving
roadway-adjacent hazards other than trees.178 Finally, this Part
will consider the question those who anticipate negative impacts
propose: why have the duty of reasonable care at all?179

171. See supra Part IV.B–C (reviewing the differing levels of immunity across
Virginia’s public bodies).
172. See supra Part IV.B–C (reviewing sovereign immunity’s impact on tort
liability).
173. See supra Part IV.B–C (reviewing the various applications of sovereign
immunity).
174. See supra Part IV.A (detailing justifications for sovereign immunity).
175. See supra Part IV.B–C (presenting various forms of liability under
sovereign immunity).
176. Infra Part V.A.
177. Infra Part V.B.
178. Infra Part V.C.
179. Infra Part V.D.
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A. More Gross Negligence Claims May Be Resolved as a Matter of
Law
At present, plaintiffs havean incentive to allege gross
negligence in actions against employees of public entities for
negligent maintenance of the roadway. This is because per the
Supreme Court of Virginia, an “employee who acts wantonly, or in
a culpable or grossly negligent manner, is not protected” by
sovereign immunity.180 By the court’s own admission, the difficult
case is when a claim of simple negligence is met with a sovereign
immunity defense.181
Gross negligence counts against employees are incentivized
for a couple of reasons. The biggest, as previously stated, is that
sovereign immunity does not protect grossly negligent acts.182
Using gross negligence as the vehicle for a claim can side-step this
potential bar to recovery.183 A second possible incentive stems from
how gross negligence claims are treated; generally, they are
decided as a matter of fact, not law, which plaintiffs may prefer.184
Although a court may dismiss a gross negligence claim as a matter
of law “when persons of reasonable minds could not differ upon the
conclusion that such negligence has not been established,”185 a
180. James v. Jane, 282 S.E.2d 864, 869 (Va. 1980). Plaintiffs may wish to
name employees to avoid employer sovereign immunity, access employee
insurance policies, or avoid the VTCA damage cap. See supra note 163 and
accompanying text (discussing these incentives).
181. See James, 282 S.E.2d at 869 (“The difficulty in application comes when
a state employee is charged with simple negligence . . . and then claims the
immunity of the state.”).
182. See id. (describing how a grossly negligent act operates as a
“loss . . . of . . . immunity”).
183. See supra notes 180–182 and accompanying text (describing the gross
negligence and sovereign immunity interaction); see also supra Part IV (reviewing
the sovereign immunity doctrine).
184. See Elliot v. Carter, 791 S.E.2d 730, 732 (Va. 2016) (“Ordinarily, the
question whether gross negligence has been established is a matter of fact to be
decided by a jury.”). Attorneys can hope to empanel a sympathetic jury which may
be more favorable to the plaintiff. See John Wilinski, When Will Jurors Find the
Plaintiff
Sympathetic?
LITIG.
INSIGHTS
(Jan.
6,
2015),
http://litigationinsights.com/case-strategies/jurors-find-plaintiff-sympathetic/
(last visited Jan. 28, 2019) (reviewing situations that will trigger juror sympathy,
such as a plaintiff’s permanent injury or death) (on file with the Washington &
Lee Law Review).
185. Elliot, 791 S.E.2d at 732. In Virginia, gross negligence is defined as, “a
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gross negligence claim in effect puts a case on the track for a jury
decision.186 To be frank, failing to plead good faith gross negligence
effectually throws away an opportunity to maintain a case if
sovereign immunity bars a simple negligence claim.187
While beneficial for plaintiffs, reliance on gross negligence
as a vehicle for avoiding sovereign immunity actually harms the
doctrine. Sovereign immunity is a doctrine that courts must
grapple with—not avoid—in order to fulfill its stated purpose of
ensuring uninterrupted public function without fear of vexatious
litigation.188 There is also the practical drawback of prolonging
litigation by shifting a case towards fact-finding, and away from
pre-trial resolution.189
degree of negligence showing indifference to another and an utter disregard of
prudence that amounts to a complete neglect of the safety of such other person.”
Id. Several acts of negligence that, by themselves, would not constitute gross
negligence can combine to become gross negligence; however, the gross negligence
standard is less than “willful, wanton, and reckless conduct.” Id. The key feature
of gross negligence is indifference; as such, “a claim for gross negligence must fail
as a matter of law when the evidence shows that the defendants exercised some
degree of care.” Id. See also Altizer v. County of Tazewell, 75 Va. Cir. 5, No.
CL07-123, 2008 WL 6744119, at *2 (Jan. 22, 2008) (“Ordinarily, gross negligence
is an issue to be resolved by the jury, however, it becomes a question of law when
the court must determine if the facts, as pled, are sufficient to determine whether
the protection of sovereign immunity may be set aside.”).
186. See, e.g., Koppel v. Morgan, 41 Va. Cir. 130, No. 152179, 1996 WL
1065633, at *2 (Nov. 5, 1996) (“The Virginia Supreme Court has recently declared
the determination of gross negligence to be an issue of fact properly decided by a
jury.”). A public entity can qualify for sovereign immunity with respect to simple
negligence, but a proper gross negligence claim is a jury question and may
continue on. See Burns v. Gagnon, 727 S.E.2d 634, 646–47 (Va. 2012) (sending
case back for jury finding with respect to employee’s gross negligence, despite
granting immunity for simple negligence); Cleaves-McClellan v. Shaw, 93 Va. Cir.
459, No. CL15-1918, 2016 WL 9076186, at *8–10 (June 30, 2016) (granting
immunity for simple negligence but sustaining action for gross negligence).
187. See, e.g., Cleaves-McClellan, 2016 WL 9076186, at *8–10 (demonstrating
how a gross negligence claim can continue a case in spite of sovereign immunity).
188. See Messina v. Burden, 321 S.E.2d 657, 660 (Va. 1984) (“[T]he doctrine
of sovereign immunity is ‘alive and well’ in Virginia.”); City of Chesapeake v.
Cunningham, 604 S.E.2d 420, 426 (Va. 2004) (“Sovereign immunity is a rule of
social policy, which protects the state from burdensome interference with the
performance of its governmental functions and preserves its control over state
funds, property, and instrumentalities.”); See also Messina, 321 S.E.2d at 660–61
(reviewing numerous purposes for sovereign immunity). For a more detailed
sovereign immunity review, see supra Part IV.A (explaining sovereign immunity
rationale).
189. See Tomlin v. McKenzie, 468 S.E.2d 882, 884 (Va. 1996) (“The defensive
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The Supreme Court of Virginia emphasizes sovereign
immunity’s importance but notes that determining which actors
are entitled to sovereign immunity presents a difficult,
fact-sensitive task for courts.190 A way to ensure sovereign
immunity’s strength is to build precedent for what types of acts
and actors deserve immunity (which gross negligence claims can
preclude by avoiding immunity analysis); this is particularly
necessary because there is no bright-line rule to determine
entitlement to immunity.191
Although the proposed duty of reasonable care may not
decrease the amount of gross negligence pleadings outright, it can
still provide a benefit to the immunity doctrine by articulating a
concrete standard of care.192 If there is a clearly delineated
standard of care, it will be easier to determine on the facts of a
given case whether an act was grossly negligent, or even negligent
at all (both for potential plaintiffs and for courts considering
pleadings).193 Thus, more of those cases that reach courts may be
resolved as a matter of immunity or law in the pleadings stage,
rather than as a matter of fact by a jury;194 thereby promoting the
plea in bar shortens the litigation by reducing it to a distinct issue of fact, which,
if proven, creates a bar to the plaintiff’s right of recovery.”). A sovereign immunity
claim is often rooted in a plea-in-bar, which as previously stated is designed to
shorten litigation. See, e.g., Hawthorne v. VanMarter, 692 S.E.2d 226, 233–34
(Va. 2010) (reviewing sovereign immunity plea-in-bar); Cunningham v. Rossman,
80 Va. Cir. 543, No. CL10-014, 2010 WL 7373694, at *1 (July 12, 2010)
(considering sovereign immunity plea-in-bar). In a plea-in-bar, “[t]he existence of
sovereign immunity is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.” Cunningham,
604 S.E.2d at 426. Although an inadequate gross negligence claim can be resolved
as a matter of law, the nature of a gross negligence claim steers towards
fact-finding. See supra notes 184–186 and accompanying text (detailing
treatment of gross negligence as a matter of fact and law).
190. See Messina, 321 S.E.2d at 662 (“Deciding which government employees
are entitled to immunity requires line-drawing. Yet, given the continued vitality
of the doctrine, the Court must engage in this difficult task.”).
191. See Pike v. Hagaman, 787 S.E.2d 89, 92 (Va. 2016) (“[W]e declined to
impose a bright line rule to determine whether an allegedly negligent state
employee is protected by the shield of sovereign immunity. We developed a list of
four non-exclusive factors to assess whether a plea of sovereign immunity should
be sustained.” (citation omitted)); see also supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the
challenges of determining immunity with respect to municipal corporations).
192. See supra Part III.B (proposing the duty of reasonable care).
193. See supra note 185 (defining gross negligence in Virginia).
194. See supra notes 185–186 and accompanying text (describing how gross
negligence can shift from a question of fact to law).
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efficient use of judicial resources and sovereign immunity’s
doctrinal strength.

B. Assumption-of-Duty Claims Will Be Limited
Establishing a duty of reasonable care has the potential to
reach beyond claims of simple negligence and gross negligence.
This is readily apparent with respect to the assumption-of-duty
doctrine, as exemplified in Cline v. Commonwealth (Cline II).195 In
Cline II, the court considered the Commonwealth’s liability for the
injuries at issue in Cline.196 Rather than decide the case on VTCA
grounds or traditional negligence grounds, the court remanded the
case for the factfinder to determine if the Commonwealth had
assumed a duty to inspect and remediate dangerous trees on the
property adjacent to the roadway.197
Accepting the Restatement assumption-of-duty doctrine, the
court found that the Commonwealth could be liable only if:
[It] undertook to inspect trees on the [property adjacent to the
roadway] for the purpose of remediating any dangerous
conditions created by trees and then either: (1) the
Commonwealth’s failure to exercise reasonable care in
performing this undertaking increased the risk of the harm; or
(2) the Commonwealth undertook to perform a duty owed by
another to Cline; or (3) Cline’s harm was suffered by his reliance
upon the Commonwealth’s undertaking.198
195. No. 151037, 2016 WL 4721393 (Va. Sept. 8, 2016).
196. See id. at *1 (detailing injuries resulting from a tree falling on a motorist
in the roadway); see also supra notes 12–15 (reviewing the Cline case).
197. See Cline, 2016 WL 4721393, at *2 (“Based on the record before us, we
cannot decide as a matter of law whether the Commonwealth assumed . . . a duty.
This question must be decided by the factfinder on remand.”) (citations omitted).
198. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (AM. LAW. INST.
1965)). Some might argue that assumption-of-duty renders the duty of reasonable
care redundant, as the Supreme Court of Virginia found assumption-of-duty
dispositive in Cline II. See id. (remanding on assumption-of-duty grounds). This
was based on the specific circumstances of the case, however; Cline alleged that
a Commonwealth employee entered the Dunlora property to inspect for and
remove dangerous trees, noticed the tree at issue, but failed to act because the
employee believed it was not in the Commonwealth’s right-of-way. See id. (“These
allegations are sufficient to give rise to a cause of action against the
Commonwealth on a theory it assumed a duty by undertaking the inspection and
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Although assumption-of-duty cases cannot be resolved as a
matter of law,199 imposing a duty of reasonable care carries some
implications for such a pleading moving forward. First, it limits
the overall need for crafting an assumption-of-duty pleading, given
that a road-maintaining entity will already be subject to the duty
of reasonable care as a matter of law (regardless of any voluntary
assumptions of responsibility).200 Second, in cases where it is pled,
it will be limited to increasing the scope of the owed duty.201 This
may make the fact-finder’s job easier, as the assumption-of-duty
claim will only be viable if the facts show that “the defendant by
his conduct assumed a duty,” distinct and beyond the scope of the
duty of reasonable care.202
C. The Duty of Reasonable Care is Applicable to Other Natural
Roadside Hazards
The proposed duty is not limited to dangerous trees adjacent
to the roadway. Motorists must contend with far more, including

remediation of dangerous conditions on the right-of-way.”). Assumption-of-duty
relies on some positive act to create a duty even if one did not exist previously.
See id. (describing assumption-of-duty). This Note is concerned with prompting
road-maintaining entities to act as a result of a pre-existing duty. See supra note
35 and accompanying text (referencing deterrence theory). Assumption-of-duty is
incapable of achieving this goal, as it is dependent on the road-maintaining entity
voluntarily taking some action that it was otherwise not required to take under
law. See, e.g., Cline, 2016 WL 4721393, at *2 (providing an example of alleged
action by a Commonwealth employee that could give rise to an assumed duty).
199. See Burns v. Gagnon, 727 S.E.2d 634, 643 (Va. 2012) (“But when the
issue is not whether the law recognizes a duty, but rather whether the defendant
by his conduct assumed a duty, the existence of that duty is a question for the
fact-finder.”).
200. See id. (“[W]hether a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty in tort is generally
a question of law.”); see also supra Part III.B (proposing a duty of reasonable care
for road-maintaining entities).
201. See, e.g., Cline, 2016 WL 4721393, at *2 (considering the duty to inspect
for dangerous trees). For instance, a claim might allege that a road-maintaining
entity assumed a duty beyond reasonable care, such as the duty to use
walk-around inspections, or a duty that would discover dangerous trees—even
those not openly dangerous from the roadway. See supra Part III.A (reviewing
examples of tort duties for road-maintaining entities beyond the duty of
reasonable care).
202. Burns, 727 S.E.2d at 643.
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falling boulders203 and hidden drop-offs.204 Motorists are not the
only individuals at risk—passersby on sidewalks are susceptible to
injury as well.205 This Note does not take a position with respect to
dangerous man-made instrumentalities adjacent to the roadway,
as Cline concerned facts relating to a natural condition adjacent to
the roadway.206 Provided the natural danger presents the same
issues seen in the present discussion,207 there is little reason why
the duty of reasonable care should be limited strictly to dangerous
trees adjacent to the roadway.208
203. See Commonwealth v. Callebs, 381 S.W.2d 623, 624 (Ky. 1964)
(referencing jurisprudence finding that the Department of Highways did not have
a duty to closely inspect for loose boulders, when boulder appeared to be imbedded
in the cliff-face).
204. See Taylor v. City of Charlottesville, 397 S.E.2d 832, 834 (Va. 1990)
(reviewing death resulting from a hidden drop adjacent to the roadway, where
city failed to provide for better lighting, guardrails, or other means to mitigate
risk of cars driving off of the drop at night).
205. See City of Norfolk v. Travis, 140 S.E. 641, 642 (Va. 1927) (considering
dangerous fence near the roadway which caused an injury to an individual on the
sidewalk).
206. See Cline v. Commonwealth, No. 151037, 2016 WL 4721393, at *1 (Va.
Sept. 8, 2016) (“In Cline . . . we held that a private landowner owes no duty to
protect motorists on adjoining public highways from natural conditions on the
landowner’s property.”). The case, however, hints that for a private landowner,
erecting a dangerous man-made instrumentality is a breach of duty. See Cline v.
Dunlora South, LLC, 726 S.E.2d 14, 18 (Va. 2012) (“The duty owed by adjoining
property owners is to refrain from engaging in any act that makes the highway
more dangerous than in a state of nature or in the state in which it has been
left.”). The Commonwealth similarly concedes that road-maintaining entity
liability extends to man-made instrumentalities adjacent to the roadway. See
infra notes 230–41 and accompanying text (explaining the Commonwealth’s
position against liability for natural conditions adjacent to the roadway).
207. See supra Parts II–III (identifying policy justifications for imposing a
duty of reasonable care on the entity that maintains the roadway).
208. See General Powers of Comm’r of Highways, VA. CODE ANN. § 33.2-223
(2018) (“[T]he Commissioner of Highways shall have the power to do all acts
necessary or convenient for constructing, improving, maintaining, and preserving
the . . . operation of the highways . . . .”). State statutory responsibility is broad
with respect to maintaining safety, and counties can assume particular
responsibilities beyond the roadway, including sidewalks and other areas. See
Certain Additional Powers of Governing Body, VA. CODE ANN. § 21-118.4 (2017)
(“[W]hen an ordinance has been adopted creating a sanitary district in such
county, . . . the . . . governing body . . . shall have the following powers and
duties . . . [t]o construct, reconstruct, maintain, alter, improve, add to, and
operate . . . sidewalks, curbs, gutters, . . . for the use and benefit of the public in
such sanitary district . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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D. Why Have a Duty?: Considering the Commonwealth’s Claim of
Negative Impact
There is a critique to imposing a duty on road-maintaining
entities, best posed as the question: why have a duty at all?
Denying liability is not a foreign concept, as “[t]here are still some
natural dangers from which we cannot rely upon the government
for protection.”209 The entire notion of sovereign immunity
functions to make the government immune from claims in tort, or
at the very least make such claims difficult or rare.210 Given the
fact that the Supreme Court of Virginia explicitly found that “a
private landowner owes no duty to protect motorists on adjoining
public highways from natural conditions on the landowner’s
property,”211 it can be argued that neither the government or
road-maintaining entities should be responsible.212
This critique is met by reality. Dangerous trees adjacent to the
roadway present real risks to motorists if left unchecked.213 The
209. Hensley v. Montgomery County, 334 A.2d 542, 547 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1975).
210. See supra Part IV (reviewing the sovereign immunity doctrine and its
challenges).
211. Cline, 2016 WL 4721393, at *1.
212. See, e.g., Brief of Appellee at 10–11, Cline v. Commonwealth, No. 151037,
2016 WL 4721393 (Va. Sept. 8, 2016) (No. 151037), 2015 WL 12752886, at *10– 11
(asserting that the Commonwealth owed no duty with respect to a dangerous tree
adjacent to the roadway).
213. See Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC, 726 S.E.2d 14, 15 (Va. 2012) (“[A] tree fell
and crushed the roof, windshield and hood of the vehicle Cline was driving. Cline
suffered severe and permanent injuries, including fractures of his cervical
spine.”); John Ramsey, Tree That Fell on Car, Killing Driver, May Have Been
Weakened by Lightning, RICHMOND-TIMES DISPATCH (Jul. 12, 2015),
http://www.richmond.com/news/local/ashland/tree-that-fell-on-car-killing-drivermay-have-been/article_fe788fe0-7e1e-5d87-bdb8-48ec3d314cb0.html (last visited
Jan. 28, 2019) (“A tree that fell on two cars . . . killing a Doswell woman, had
apparently been struck by lightning and weakened over time . . . .”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Justin Jouvenal, Tree That Crushed Driver
Was Decayed, WASH. POST (Jul. 18, 2012), https://www.Washington
post.com/local/crime/tree-that-crushed-driver-was-decayed/2012/07/18/gJQAb2O
iuW_story.html?utm_term=.cc22af1832d6 (last visited Jan. 28, 2019) (“The
massive oak that fell and killed a driver in Great Falls . . . was . . . destined to
fall, according to a state arborist . . . . VDOT officials said the tree was in their
right of way . . . . [A]n arborist who lives in Great Falls . . . said the tree had
obvious signs of decay and ‘should have been taken down.’”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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chief inspiration for this Note and proposed duty is therefore a
simple one—to increase roadway safety by ensuring, when
reasonably possible, that dangerous trees are removed from the
roadside before they can injure motorists.214
The safety argument supporting road-maintainer liability
could be applied to landowner liability.215 Why single out the
road-maintaining entity? This question is addressed in Part II, but
in short, the road-maintaining entity is in the best position for
preventing the harm.216 By definition, the road-maintaining entity
is charged with maintaining the roadway—and “[t]he [actor] in the
best position to prevent the harm is the logical [actor] to hold
accountable for the harm.”217 In agreement with this principle,
Cline noted that “[t]he duty of the [public entity that maintains the
highway] is to perform a positive act in the preparation and
preservation of a sufficient traveled way.”218 As the injuries at
issue here are principally a matter of roadway safety, the liability
should fall to the entity responsible for the roadway.219 Finally, as
a matter of practicality, Cline leaves the road-maintaining entity
as the only entity potentially liable for injuries resulting from tree
falls in the roadway—a binary distinction which has seen some use
in this area of law.220 As such, road-maintaining entities are the
214. See Ford v. S.C. Dept. of Transp., 492 S.E.2d 811, 814 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997)
(finding that liability hinges on “whether the [road-maintaining entity] knew, or
in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that the condition of the
tree would make it hazardous to persons or property in the immediate vicinity”).
Deterrence theory is the primary enforcement mechanism. See supra note 35 and
accompanying text (providing an overview of deterrence theory for the position
that someone should be liable for injuries resulting from roadway-adjacent trees).
215. See supra notes 35, 213–214 (presenting safety concerns and deterrence
theory).
216. See supra Part II.B (reviewing justifications for imposing a duty of
reasonable care on the road-maintaining entity).
217. Mari Matsuda, On Causation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2195, 2211 (2000).
218. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 18 (alteration added in Cline) (quoting Price v.
Travis, 140 S.E. 644, 646 (Va. 1927)). Conversely, private landowners have no
affirmative duty to act. See id. (“The duty owed by adjoining property owners is
to refrain from engaging in any act that makes the highway more dangerous than
in a state of nature or in the state in which it has been left.”).
219. See supra Part II.B (discussing in detail the justification for differing
liabilities between road-maintaining entities and landowners).
220. See Cline v. Commonwealth, No. 151037, 2016 WL 4721393, at *1 (Va.
Sept. 8, 2016) (“In Cline . . . we held that a private landowner owes no duty to
protect motorists on adjoining public highways from natural conditions on the
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only actors that, in Virginia, can have the requisite liability-driven
motivation to effect change and enhance roadway safety.221
The Commonwealth of Virginia advocated against a
roadway-adjacent maintenance duty in Cline II. It asserted that a
heightened duty on the Commonwealth would “create a scenario
in which a private person, having no duty or liability, would have
no incentive to remedy a natural condition adjacent to the
roadway. This scenario would create even more danger to the
public.”222 The Commonwealth’s argument rests on the premise
that notwithstanding the absence of a legal duty, landowners will
still remedy dangerous trees on their lands, but that this altruism
will somehow disappear if another entity is made responsible.223
Given that damages are often necessary to compel a change in
behavior,224 any real incentive for landowners vanished with
Cline.225 Following the Commonwealth’s argument to its logical
conclusion, furthermore, leads to a poor result.226 A situation can
arise where a road-maintaining entity and a private landowner
have actual notice of a tree’s dangerous condition, and both may
choose not to act without fear of liability; in spite of the tree being
located adjacent to the entity’s roadway and on the landowner’s
private property.227 Should that tree fall into the roadway and
landowner’s property.”); supra note 33 and accompanying text (presenting the
binary distinction).
221. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (describing tort law’s deterrent
effect and its ability to promote investments in safety); see also infra notes
222– 229 (discussing motivations to remedy dangerous trees).
222. Brief of Appellee at 16, Cline v. Commonwealth, No. 151037, 2016 WL
4721393 (Va. Sept. 8, 2016) (No. 151037), 2015 WL 12752886, at *16.
223. See Brief of Appellee at 16, Cline v. Commonwealth, No. 151037, 2016
WL 4721393 (Va. Sept. 8, 2016) (No. 151037), 2015 WL 12752886, at *16
(presenting the Commonwealth’s argument).
224. See Hamilton Dev. Co. v. Broad Rock Club, Inc., 445 S.E.2d 140, 144 (Va.
1994) (awarding punitive damages for trespass); id. (Whiting, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (remarking that “the purpose of punitive damages is
to ‘punish the defendant for [its] conduct and to serve as a warning to others not
to engage in similar activity’”); see also supra note 35 and accompanying text
(reviewing tort law’s deterrent effect as a function of economics).
225. See Cline, 2016 WL 4721393, at *1 (“[A] private landowner owes no duty
to protect motorists on adjoining public highways from natural conditions on the
landowner’s property.”).
226. See supra notes 222–223 and accompanying text (presenting the
Commonwealth’s logic-based argument).
227. See, e.g., Cline, 2016 WL 4721393, at *1 (“Cline now pursues negligence

IF A TREE FALLS IN A ROADWAY

551

cause injury, the innocent motorist, having had no control over the
tree, nor the ability to respond to or remedy the dangerous
condition, would bear the entire burden of loss.228 This is an
unacceptable outcome. In order to achieve the Commonwealth’s
articulated desire to increase safety and incentivize remedying
dangerous conditions, the only viable course of action is to place
responsibility in the hands of road-maintaining entities, including
the Commonwealth.229
As a means of supplementing policy with law, the
Commonwealth argued that the law does not impose a duty with
respect to natural conditions because “while a municipality may
have a duty to the traveled portion of the roadway, it owes no duty
to inspect and remedy the portion of its right-of-way left in a state
of nature.”230 The Commonwealth further argued that when it has
a duty with respect to dangers beyond the bounds of the roadway,
the duty is limited strictly to “defective instrumentalities” and does
not apply to natural conditions.231 The Supreme Court of Virginia
did not see fit to address these claims,232 but this Note will attempt
to do so.
First, the assertion is too limited with respect to the idea that
liability is limited to man-made instrumentalities as a matter of
law and policy.233 The Commonwealth’s argument relies on a single
and nuisance claims against the Commonwealth because the tree allegedly fell
from the Commonwealth’s right-of-way on the Dunlora property.”).
228. See supra notes 35, 217 and accompanying text (supporting the
argument that innocent motorists should not bear the burden of loss because
“[t]he [actor] in the best position to prevent the harm is the logical [actor] to hold
accountable for the harm”).
229. See supra notes 35, 222 and accompanying text (recounting the deterrent
effect in tort law and the Commonwealth’s emphasis on protecting motorists).
230. Brief of Appellee at 12, Cline v. Commonwealth, No. 151037, 2016 WL
4721393 (Va. Sept. 8, 2016) (No. 151037), 2015 WL 12752886, at *12 (citing City
of Norfolk v. Travis, 140 S.E. 641 (Va. 1927)).
231. See Brief of Appellee at 13, Cline v. Commonwealth, No. 151037, 2016
WL 4721393 (Va. Sept. 8, 2016) (No. 151037), 2015 WL 12752886, at *13 (claiming
that natural conditions adjacent to the roadway are exempt from Commonwealth
tort liability).
232. See Cline v. Commonwealth, No. 151037, 2016 WL 4721393, at *2–3 (Va.
Sept. 8, 2016) (resolving case on assumption-of-duty grounds).
233. See Brief of Appellee at 13, Cline v. Commonwealth, No. 151037, 2016
WL 4721393 (Va. Sept. 8, 2016) (No. 151037), 2015 WL 12752886, at *13 (arguing
that liability only extends to man-made dangers).
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statement in a 1927 case: “[C]ities in the exercise of governmental
discretion may lay out part of the platted street for public use and
leave the remaining exterior limits unused and in a state of nature
without obligation to the public . . . .”234 The Commonwealth fails,
however, to give due weight to developments in the almost century
since. In Taylor v. City of Charlottesville,235 the Supreme Court of
Virginia found that a steep drop into a creek adjacent to the
roadway constituted a defective instrumentality, thereby
representing an actionable danger.236 Beyond the fact that a land
feature—a steep drop into a creek—is more akin to a dangerous
tree adjacent to the roadway than a man-made instrumentality
(the case was not clear whether the drop or creek was man-made
or natural),237 as the court stated, “[t]he rule, indeed, would be but
half discharged were it not held to make the municipality liable for
dangers known to exist outside the street’s limit, but so near
thereto as to endanger public travel thereon.”238 It follows that the
rule would be “half-discharged” if real dangers were ignored simply
because a tree was a natural condition adjacent to the roadway,
but nevertheless “endangered public travel thereon.”239 The Taylor
court saw no need to address whether the steep drop was entirely
man-made or natural; rather, the principle focused on whether
there was a danger to travelers in the roadway—thus, danger is
the source of duty.240 Danger does not lie in imposing a duty, as the
234. City of Norfolk v. Travis, 140 S.E. 641, 644 (Va. 1927); see also id. at 12,
*12 (citing this language).
235. 397 S.E.2d 832 (Va. 1990).
236. See id. at 836 (“We do not think the rule is so limited as to exclude all
danger arising beyond the limits of a street. The purpose of the rule is to provide
safety to persons lawfully using the streets.” (quoting Burson v. City of Bristol, 10
S.E.2d 541, 545 (1940) (emphasis added)).
237. See Brief of Appellee at 13, Cline v. Commonwealth, No. 151037, 2016
WL 4721393 (Va. Sept. 8, 2016) (No. 151037), 2015 WL 12752886, at *13
(describing the Taylor case as concerning an instrumentality); Taylor, 397 S.E.2d
at 834 (describing the ditch as a “steep precipice descending into Meadow Creek”).
238. Taylor, 397 S.E.2d at 836 (quoting Burson v. City of Bristol, 10 S.E.2d
541, 545 (1940).
239. Id. See also id. (“In the present case, the alleged condition at the
terminus of [the road] is ‘dangerous and hazardous in itself’ and imperils the
safety of . . the street. Furthermore, the dangerous condition is located adjacent
to the street. . . . [T]he motion . . . effectively alleges a public nuisance.”).
240. See Taylor, 397 S.E.2d at 836 (articulating the need to remediate
dangerous conditions adjacent to the roadway for the purpose of public safety).
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Commonwealth argues.241 The “danger to the public”242 is in
continuing to fail to do so.
Second, a number of out-of-state cases assisted in forming the
original non-liability for natural conditions rule.243 This Note has
shown that there is a trend in the law supporting liability in the
opposite direction,244 so it is worth reassessing given the rule’s
origin. Notwithstanding Virginia’s own legal developments,245 a
review of out-of-state duties suggests that natural dangers
adjacent to the roadway are a source of liability for
road-maintaining entities.246
Finally, the Commonwealth’s arguments have already lost at
the circuit level. Zook was clear: “Based on the footnote in
Cline . . . VDOT had the duty to exercise reasonable care to remove
the . . . tree . . . and the duty of reasonable care ‘to maintain the
natural vegetation on the property’ adjacent to [the roadway].”247
But see Brief of Appellee at 13, Cline v. Commonwealth, No. 151037, 2016 WL
4721393 (Va. Sept. 8, 2016) (No. 151037), 2015 WL 12752886, at *13 (“In fact, in
Cline I, this Court stated that it has ‘never recognized that principles of ordinary
negligence apply to natural conditions on land.’”). The more appropriate question
is whether ordinary principles of negligence apply to negligent maintenance of
the roadway, including roadway-adjacent dangers. See Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC,
726 S.E.2d 14, 18 (Va. 2012) (“The duty of the [public entity that maintains the
highway] is to perform a positive act in the preparation and preservation of a
sufficient traveled way.” (alteration added in Cline) (quoting Price v. Travis, 140
S.E. 644, 646 (Va. 1927))); Taylor, 397 S.E.2d at 836 (extending liability to
dangerous conditions beyond the roadway).
241. See supra notes 222–223 and accompanying text (presenting the
Commonwealth’s argument that imposing a duty on the state will increase the
risk of danger to travelers).
242. Brief of Appellee at 16, Cline v. Commonwealth, No. 151037, 2016 WL
4721393 (Va. Sept. 8, 2016) (No. 151037), 2015 WL 12752886, at *16.
243. See City of Norfolk v. Travis, 140 S.E. 641, 642 (Va. 1927) (compiling
cases to establish non-liability for injuries resulting from natural conditions
adjacent to the roadway).
244. See supra Part III.A (describing various duties with respect to trees
adjacent to the roadway); see also Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 20–21 (Lemons, J.,
dissenting) (reviewing out-of-state duties with respect to a landowner’s liability
for injuries resulting from trees falling into the roadway).
245. See supra notes 235–240 and accompanying text (reviewing Virginia law
for the position that a road-maintaining entity can be liable for negligent
maintenance of natural roadway-adjacent dangers).
246. See supra Part III.A (reviewing out-of-state treatment of natural
roadway-adjacent dangers, and finding support for liability).
247. Zook v. City of Norfolk, 87 Va. Cir. 47, No. CL12–4019, 2014 WL
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The tide flows against the non-liability position,248 and towards a
duty of reasonable care.249
VI. Conclusion
Reducing the risk of trees falling on motorists in the roadway
is a worthwhile and achievable goal for the Commonwealth.
Although the Supreme Court of Virginia found in Cline that
private landowners are not required to participate in this change
for the better, road-maintaining entities can, and should, be
required to do so by remedying dangerous trees adjacent to
roadways. Road-maintaining entities are appropriate for this task,
as they are the entities in charge of roadway safety.
The Supreme Court of Virginia should adopt a duty of
reasonable care for road-maintaining entities. This duty ensures
that when a tree is visibly decayed, someone will have the legal
incentive to do something about it. Innocent motorists,
furthermore, will not be left to bear the burden should a
negligently maintained tree cause injury. For the sake of safety in
the Commonwealth, it is time to put this legal uncertainty to rest,
and recognize the duty of reasonable care.

3891750, at *5 (July 19, 2014).
248. See Dix W. Noel, Nuisances from Land in its Natural Condition, 56 HARV.
L. REV. 772, 791 (1943) (explaining, for landowners, “[i]t is clear that the
prevailing rule of nonliability for natural trees has received a distinctly limited
application with reference to trees which endanger persons or property on the
public highway.”). To borrow the author’s language and apply it to this Note’s
focus, “[w]ith the great increase of travel in modern times, and the growing
tendency to protect travelers, the imposition . . . of the burden of due care in
removing [dangerous trees] . . . would seem to be justified in view of the grave
harm threatened to users of the highways.” Id.
249. See Zook, 2014 WL 3891750, at *3–5 (finding that the City of Norfolk and
the Commonwealth of Virginia had the duty of reasonable care to remedy
dangerous trees adjacent to the roadway).

